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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This research project will examine the concept of sovereignty in Vermont for the 
years 1750-1791. As with most conceptual studies, it is necessary to first examine the 
history of the concept. I begin with René Descartes (1596-1650), and his re-
conceptualization of Man in a natural state. It is my contention that his metaphysical and 
ontological findings in Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) were then adopted by 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in Leviathan (1651), and John Locke (1632-1704) in Two 
Treatises of Government (1689). Basing their philosophies on Descartes’s “revised” 
depiction of Man in nature, both Hobbes and Locke envisioned a Man who naturally made 
both rational and passionate decisions, as communities transitioned, via the process of 
government formation, from the state of nature into the state of “civil society,” as they 
termed it.  Contemporaneous with this theoretical evolution was the inclusion of “the 
people’” in British governance through the rise of Parliament at the turn of the seventeenth 
century. Juxtaposed with real events, the philosophers’ reconceptualization demonstrates 
an evolving concept of sovereignty in the British state. By the time of the American 
Revolution, the concept of popular sovereignty was born, and “the people” ascended in 
both political theory and political reality.  
Because the eighteenth-century concept of sovereignty was based heavily on the 
metaphor of the state of nature, I chose the inhabitants of the New Hampshire Grants as a 
case study. These residents believed they resided in something close to a literal state of 
nature from 1760-1777, and that they had lived the theoretical philosophies of Hobbes, 
Locke, and other contemporary theorists. Once the theoretical description of a natural state 
is juxtaposed with the socio-political history of the Grants region, it is clear that inhabitants 
believed the Colony of New York, the appendage of the British state which claimed 
authority in the region, did not provide efficient governance for the residents. After the 
American Revolution broke out, Grants residents claimed it was their natural right to erect 
a state and systematically replace New York. Once Vermont’s constitution went into effect 
in 1778, the concept of sovereignty was expressed in response to two simultaneous 
processes: the first, the geo-political stabilization of the state in the midst of both war and 
constant challenges to the state’s existence; the second, the Vermont people transforming 
from a blend of “Yorkers” and “Yankees” into Vermonters. Both of these processes were 
complete by the mid-1780s as surrounding states and former Yorkers grew to accept the 
legitimacy of Vermont. By the late 1780s, as the United States Constitutional Convention 
was underway, Vermont was no longer considered a “pretended state,” and was able to 
face the convention on its own terms, representing its own sovereign people. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
As early as the thirteenth century the word “sovereignty” was attached to the 
notion of ultimate authority, or supreme rule. By the seventeenth century, it was 
understood that a source must have enough power to enforce its will and establish its 
position in society as sovereign. This supreme power was not without its own code of 
ethics, however, and the job taken on by many seventeenth-century political philosophers 
was to define the sovereign’s duties and terms of engagement with both the people and 
other sovereign states. The “state of nature” was a metaphorical phrase commonly found 
in the methodology of political philosophers who believed its usage illuminated features 
of pure and ideal governments. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke are examples of two 
prominent political philosophers who wrote (arguably) their most influential works on 
the natural creation of government. This project will juxtapose the socio-political history 
of Vermont’s tumultuous infancy within the conceptual framework provided by 
Leviathan and Two Treatises of Government. 
An introduction into the state of nature and its relationship to the creation of a 
sovereign state, as it was understood in Vermont during the Revolutionary period, is 
clearest when considering Thomas Jefferson’s remarks on the Green Mountains’ 
inhabitants. Rather than use the phrase “state of nature” as it was understood 
metaphorically by Jefferson and his contemporaries (including Hobbes and Locke), the 
people of Vermont spoke about their literal experience in a “state of nature” as a 
justification for creating a government.  
 2 
In his 1783 letter to Edmund Randolph, Jefferson neglected to consider the actual 
experiences of Vermont residents when discussing Vermont’s relationship to the state of 
nature metaphor. Jefferson first commented on a “doctrine of the most mischievous 
tendency” which had appeared in an act passed by the Virginia Assembly in December 
1782.1 The legislation stated that loyalist refugees and merchants who sought to claim 
debts in Virginia ought not to be allowed to return, even under a flag of truce. The 
legislation, Jefferson commented, “stands on its best ground…on the reasonableness of 
a mutual risk in all contests…if we staked everything and they nothing.” But there was 
more to the resolution, Jefferson continued: 
Not content with this they go on to talk of the dissolution of the social contract 
on a revolution of government, and much other little stuff by which I collect their 
meaning to have been that on changing the form of our government all our laws 
were dissolved, and ourselves reduced to a state of nature. This is precisely the 
Vermont doctrine. 
 
Jefferson believed that the Virginia colonists, like the Vermonters, confused the 
independence movement with the “dissolution of the social contract.” “The term social 
contract” was itself a theoretical one, he argued, but if “forced into practical use,” the 
“contract” must apply to the people themselves and every individual law they lived under 
during the former government. He summarized his argument with a metaphor: “If you 
and I have a contract of six articles and agree to amend two of them, this does not dissolve 
the remaining four.” Why, Jefferson asked, would removing British laws such as “the 
                                                
1 Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, 2/15/1783, National Archives, “Founders Online,” 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/, last accessed 2/12/2017. The historians that 
work on the National Archives “Founders Online” transcriptions include meticulous footnotes 
that describe and quote the Virginia resolves.  
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mode of appointing judges” affect “another law which had said that on the death of a 
father his eldest son shall inherit his lands?” The point here is that Jefferson mistakenly 
equated the claim advanced in this Virginia legislation--that colonists resided in a 
theoretical “state of nature”--with a very different use of the term coming from the Green 
Mountains.2 Although Jefferson labelled this idea “precisely the Vermont doctrine,” it 
only partially reflected the Vermont experience.  
 The “state of nature” phrase was used in similar ways by both Vermonters and 
the residents of other colonies in the sense that both groups used it to justify their new 
governments. But as Jefferson argued, the real “state of nature” could only come about 
if “all our laws were dissolved,” a claim he further justified with his metaphor.  To him, 
a state of nature could exist only in a situation of complete lawlessness, which he argued 
no colonist experienced in reality. Many residents of the Hampshire Grants, however, 
did believe they were experiencing a period of complete lawlessness in the sense that 
state civil institutions were unrealistically distant, protection was hardly protective, and 
worst of all in the eyes of these inhabitants (thanks to Locke), one’s property was 
constantly threatened. The concept of sovereignty in Vermont has eluded historians for 
the past two centuries. 
                                                
2 Peter Onuf does consider the “Vermont doctrine” and its appeal to the rhetoric of the colonies. 
Even Ethan Allen stated that “legally speaking,” Vermont remained under the sovereignty of the 
British state. But as I mentioned previously, one should not discuss the realm of legality alone 
when examining the concept of sovereignty. See “State Making in Revolutionary America: 
Independent Vermont as a Case Study” in The Journal of American History Vol. 67, no. 4 (Mar., 
1981), pp. 797-815; 804. 
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While the use of natural right rhetoric in Vermont during the Revolutionary era 
has been noted by historians, seldom has it received a specific analysis that places 
Vermont within a transcontinental intellectual framework. Peter Onuf, a leading scholar 
of eighteenth-century intellectual thought, performs an erudite legal analysis of early 
Vermont (called the “Hampshire Grants” before 1777). He spends little time on natural 
law discourse, however, because he concludes that Vermonters formulated contradictory 
arguments of natural rights; they spoke as if they were experiencing a “state of nature,” 
but were at no point really in that state.  Instead, Onuf argues, they resided in “extra 
provisional” land, and within such “crown lands” the king’s authority was still absolute.3 
Kevin Graffagnino followed this line of argument a few years later, suggesting that 
Vermont residents could claim to be “in a state of nature” only after the Green Mountain 
Boys “dismantled New York’s structure of government east of the Hudson.”4 
Graffagnino acknowledges, rightly I believe, that the claim to being in a state of nature 
in Vermont was related to “New York’s failure to rule effectively with a functioning and 
responsible court system, representative legislature, and wartime administration,” but 
does not spend much time on the history of the nature claim.  
                                                
3 Peter Onuf, 802-5. “State Making” is a short article synthesized from his book The Origins of 
the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); for “extra provisional” quote, Origins of 
the Federal Republic, 133. 
4 Kevin J. Graffagnino, “The Country My Soul Delighted in”: The Onion River Land Company 
and the Vermont Frontier” in The New England Quarterly, vol. 65, no.1 (March 1992), pp. 24-
60; 37. 
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Nicholas H. Muller III and Michael Bellesiles have done the most for early 
Vermont political historiography, but from very different perspectives. Muller was hired 
as a history professor at the University of Vermont in 1966, and has been largely involved 
in most of the major historical studies of Vermont since that time. He was in the vanguard 
of a revisionist movement in Vermont historiography that warned researchers to be 
careful about exaggerating Ethan Allen’s role in early Vermont. In addition, Muller has 
also played a major role in re-conceptualizing the political philosophy of Vermont’s 
founders.5 Undermining the longstanding belief in Vermont’s democratic egalitarianism 
is no simple task (and it is certainly not the aim of this study), and Muller has done an 
impressive job in at least destabilizing it. The complexity of the political and intellectual 
culture of early Vermont is described in Bellesiles’ monumental work, Revolutionary 
Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the Early American Frontier. 
This is a well-researched analysis of politics in early Vermont, but as the title suggests, 
Bellesiles’s study is primarily on the history of early Vermont from the perspective of 
one individual, Ethan Allen. Bellesiles makes the provocative claim that “the Revolution 
placed all Americans in a state of nature,”6 but does not spend much time exploring the 
concept in depth. In Vermont historiography, scholars have agreed that Vermonters 
                                                
5 See John J. Duffy and Nicholas H. Muller III, Inventing Ethan Allen (Hanover: University Press 
of New England, 2014).  Also, Muller’s call in his “Giving Form to Vermont’s History: The 
Challenge for the Future” for scholars to “approach and understand the Vermont experience in 
larger regional, national, international, and increasingly, global terms,” was influential for this 
project, 105, https://vermonthistory.org/journal/71/vt711_210.pdf. 
6	  Michael A. Bellesiles, Revolutionary Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence 
on the Early American Frontier, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1993), 158.	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claimed it was their natural right to erect a state; this claim of natural right, and its 
relationship to the concept of sovereignty in Vermont, is the crux of this study.  
Bringing the Vermont experience into the larger discussion of the concept of 
sovereignty is not only fruitful for Vermont scholarship, but the unique case study also 
adds to the more general historiography of sovereignty in the eighteenth century. My 
study looks to build on the understanding of sovereignty put forward by Edmund 
Morgan’s Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and 
America.7 Morgan contends that sovereignty was a “myth” necessary to the functioning 
of government in the British state during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His 
primary argument—that sovereignty was an abstract ideal, which citizens and 
governments simultaneously, yet cautiously moved toward—was a significant break 
from previous scholarship that analyzed the concept of sovereignty primarily from the 
words of intellectuals. Morgan traced the relationship between the people and 
government via a thorough analysis of both rhetorical and systematic alterations that 
influenced ideas of sovereignty in the British empire, ultimately concluding with the 
creation of the American people in 1776. Morgan’s juxtaposition of rhetoric and events 
is a model for this project. 
To perform this juxtaposition, I will examine how the people of Vermont 
interacted with the myth of sovereignty. Such an analysis would not be possible without 
Christian Fritz’s American Sovereigns: The People and America’s Constitutional 
                                                
7 Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and 
America, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1988). 
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Tradition Before the Civil War.8 Fritz examines different Euro-American communities 
to see how “the people” expressed their role as sovereign through interposition, public 
disorder, and polemics. One community in particular that receives Fritz’s attention is 
Vermont. His analysis of Vermonters during the period of state formation is based 
heavily on natural law philosophy, which he asserts thrived in the region during the time 
of the Revolution. Vermonters’ belief in the “right, if not the duty, to resist tyranny and 
oppression” was rooted in the long tradition of English constitutionalism; a tradition that 
was replicated in America. Although American constitutionalism “contained within 
itself” a potential for instability, it was the sovereign people that formed the “foundation 
for all of America’s new governments.” This change over time from the sovereignty of 
the state to the sovereignty of the people is by far the most important theme of this work. 
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter will examine the 
concept of sovereignty as it evolved both theoretically and systematically in English 
society. I begin by examining the philosophy of René Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes’s 
thesis in Meditations on First Philosophy (1641)— that Man9 was a creature with the 
divine gift of free will, and that with careful study, humans could use their free will to 
                                                
8 Christian Fritz, American Sovereigns: The People and America’s Constitutional Tradition 
Before the Civil War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Another analytical study 
with a nuanced approach to sovereignty is Mark Schmeller, Invisible Sovereign: Imagining 
Public Opinion from the Revolution to Reconstruction, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2016), which, although only recently published, has already provided much for the 
historical analysis of sovereignty in early America.  
9	  While I acknowledge the scholarship pertaining to all three philosophers’ use of the word 
“Man,” I was unable to include a discussion of this topic within this thesis. Eighteenth-century 
notions of masculinity certainly played a significant role in Vermont, but gender relations were 
beyond the scope of this project.	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discover truth without direct assistance from God—was fundamental to his influence on 
the political philosophy of both Hobbes and Locke.10 These two political philosophers 
went a great deal further to understand government as a natural process solely initiated 
by, and for the benefit of, Man. Both philosophers determined that the state of nature, 
where they believed Man had no restriction on his will, was undesirable. Thus 
government, as it was understood by Hobbes and Locke, was a necessary aspect of 
human society. Both philosophers saw consent and trust as vital to a successful 
government. Following Morgan’s work, throughout this chapter I point out monumental 
alterations in the functionality of English government during the seventeenth century. 
That the state placed the people before all, including God, became an integral part of how 
British subjects defined a legitimate government. By 1777, however, colonists across 
America deemed the British state inefficient and unjust, and made the collective decision 
to systematically replace it. Simply put, their justification was that if government was 
established for the people, then the people reserved a natural right to abolish the 
governmental system. This chapter concludes with an analysis of Thomas Jefferson’s 
notion of the “Vermont doctrine.” His comments, written in 1783, represent a 
culmination of over a century of philosophers conceptualizing the relationship between 
sovereignty and the state of nature. It does appear, however, that he did not precisely 
understand how that notion applied to the Vermont experience. 
                                                
10Although there exists an argument that Hobbes did not believe humans had the ability to 
uncover truth, I do not believe a distinction is necessary in this project between ultimate truth 
and something very close to it. See James Martel, Subverting the Leviathan: Reading Thomas 
Hobbes as a Radical Democrat, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 81-2. 
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Building on my short treatment of Vermont’s “state of nature” in the conclusion 
of the previous chapter, the second chapter leaves behind the more theoretical perspective 
and focuses specifically on Vermont’s socio-political environment prior to the American 
Revolution. The Hampshire Grants, as the territory was initially known, was formally 
acquired by Great Britain following the French and Indian War. Prior to the siege of 
Montreal in 1760, the Green Mountains were a rather uninviting location for English 
colonists: the land was frequented by Native and French scouts and seasonal hunters of 
Algonquin dialect.  To make matters worse, seldom did reports from the scattered British 
frontier posts provide welcoming news. That all began to change in 1759 as the British 
military began its push towards Montreal. Located on the western frontier of New 
Hampshire, the northeastern frontier of New York, and the northern frontier of 
Massachusetts, Grants inhabitants struggled to develop a society their contemporaries 
would have considered “civil.” After the crown determined the territory belonged to New 
York in 1764, inhabitants expected the government to provide the necessary aspects of 
civil society—a functioning judicial system, the protection of property, and the security 
of their livelihoods. For some, these expectations were not met, and thus they viewed it 
as their right to refute and replace the inefficient system. While the majority of 
inhabitants stood with New York authority, by the early 1770s they could not ignore the 
growing opposition as it transformed into the Green Mountain Boys: an aggressive, 
consolidated, and powerful movement, produced by the inefficiency of the New York 
colony.  
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And finally, the third chapter discusses the period of the independent Vermont 
state and its transition out of a perceived state of nature. Shortly after the Revolution 
began, those who opposed New York’s authority drafted the Vermont constitution in 
1777; and by 1778, Vermont participated in the American Revolution as an independent 
state. The system of government established by the constitution gave a massive amount 
of power to the freemen of Vermont, with the intention of establishing “the people” as 
ultimate authority. Determined in their cause, Vermonters worked to remain independent 
and defended the state’s autonomy against both internal and external threats to their claim 
of legitimacy. Both grudging Yorkers residing within their claimed territory and 
commentators from neighboring states referred to Vermont as a “pretended” state for the 
first few years of independence. By 1785, however, all this had changed, and all who 
lived within the former Hampshire Grants considered themselves Vermonters. For the 
first time since the state’s inception in 1777, Vermont possessed the support of all its 
inhabitants. This domestic transition, one that moved towards the establishment of civil 
society, enabled Vermont to approach the Constitutional Convention as a sovereign 
entity. 
  
 11 
CHAPTER 1: A PLEA TO THE NATURAL WORLD 
Since Aristotle, political theorists have examined the metaphor of the “state of 
nature” in search of a true and legitimate form of government. Prior to René Descartes 
(1596-1650), however, this mode of inquiry searched for truth in the nature of a being-- 
i.e. God or an ideal form of Man—that was not universally applicable to all humans. In 
Meditations on the First Philosophy (1641), Descartes argued that he, as a human, had 
uncovered philosophically and scientifically grounded objective truth about the true 
nature of all Man, an ability previously thought to be reserved for God(s) only.11 
Descartes’s innovative perspective of Man revolutionized the way political theorists 
understood human society and government.    
With this approach, I am following James V. Schall’s claim that “any theoretical 
explanation of politics depends on attitudes and positions which stem from metaphysics, 
theology, ethics, or science”—all of which Descartes was well versed in.12 Descartes’s 
                                                
11 In 1627 or 1628, after attending a meeting of contemporary skeptics looking to undermine the 
Scholastic school’s hold on academics, Descartes refused to accept the lecturer’s findings, stating 
that they still settled for “mere probability.” See Steven Nadler, The Philosopher, the Priest, and 
The Painter: A Portrait of Descartes, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 92.  For 
Descartes’s opposition to Galileo’s understanding of nature as “an unintegrated condition and 
lacking in philosophical foundations,” see James Collins, “Descartes’s Philosophy of Nature” in 
American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series no. 5, ed. Nicholas Rescher, (Pittsburgh: 
Basil Blackwell with the cooperation of the University of Pittsburgh, 1971), 40-41. Peter A. 
Schouls, The Imposition of Method: A Study of Descartes and Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1980), 6. Schouls states that Man’s ability to be “rational” was defined more broadly by Descartes 
than had been done previously. For more on Descartes and the scholastics, see Stephen 
Gaukroger, Descartes’s System of Natural Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 35-48. 
12James Schall, “Cartesianism and Political Theory,” in The Review of Politics, Vol. 24, No. 2 
(April, 1962), pp. 260-282; 260. Collins, Philosophy of Nature, 43: “The function of metaphysics 
is not to render this distinct analysis superfluous or to supplant it with other meanings. Instead, 
metaphysics broadens the entire context of the inquiry into nature, so as to face the existential 
 12 
depiction of nature was abstract and deeply spiritual in its essence, but on the surface he 
used rationalistic rhetoric. The fundamental component of his metaphysics was his 
depiction of Man as a creature who made both rational and irrational decisions based on 
the memory of material experience (even if it was to doubt them). At the same time, 
Descartes acknowledged that Man was hampered by a material body which naturally 
desired material things. This materialistic metaphysics provided a detailed blueprint for 
the wave of empirically-minded political thinkers in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. The acknowledgement of two distinct worlds, one physical and the 
other mental, ultimately led Descartes to determine that there existed a mind and body. 
He believed this dualism to be an irrefutable aspect of reality. Descartes set out in 
Meditations to philosophically justify a secularization of studies pertaining to the natural 
world.13 Hobbes and Locke, and then the American states, appropriated Descartes’s 
metaphysics for their political ideas.  
Cartesian Nature 
There is a good reason René Descartes is seldom brought up in the discussion of 
seventeenth-century political philosophers. A recluse by nature, he tried to distance 
himself from cities, company, and most intellectuals. He was also hesitant to speak 
                                                
question and relate the complex significance of nature to the other reflective interpretants of 
human experience.” Also, Timothy Reiss considers the possibility that Descartes’s metaphysics 
had lasting effects on other areas of study, including politics. His example is when Jean Le Rond 
d’Alembert in the eighteenth century considered Descartes a plausible “leader of conspirators 
who, before anyone else, had the courage to rise against a despotic and arbitrary power.” 
“Descartes, the Palatine, and the Thirty Years War: Political Theory and Political Practice” in 
Yale French Studies, no. 80, (1991), pp. 108-145; 124.   
13 Descartes’s System of Natural Philosophy, 77. 
 13 
openly about government and high politics, and only did so with gentlemanly restraint. 
In correspondence with Elizabeth of the Palatinate, when Elizabeth requested that they 
both study Machiavelli’s Prince, Descartes respectfully replied, “I deserve to be mocked 
if I think I might be able to teach something to your Highness in this matter.”14 His 
awkwardness stemmed from his belief that he did not think of himself as a “Prince.” He 
stated that a Prince is ordained by God to lead, much like a scientist is ordained by God 
to do science. Princes and sovereigns have different rules than he: “For justice between 
Sovereigns has other limits than between individuals, and it seems that in these 
encounters God gives the right to those to whom he gives the power.”15  
Descartes’s self- proclaimed distance from the realm of politics paved the way 
for a deferential relationship between the people and state in the Cartesian concept of 
sovereignty. For Descartes, a government’s sole purpose was to maintain order: “political 
disorder can interfere with man’s life of thought, even though thought is not essentially 
subject to material conditions. Therefore, the task of politics [and government] is to 
guarantee by force a calm and peaceful social and political order.”16 As long as 
individuals possessed their freedom of inquiry, Descartes believed the sovereign was 
legitimate.17  To pay attention to Descartes in a discussion of political history may at first 
                                                
14 Andrea Nye, Princess and the Philosopher: Letters of Elisabeth of the Palatine to René 
Descartes, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), 103.  
15 Nye, 103 and 123. 
16 Reiss, “Descartes, the Palatine, and the Thirty Years War,” 264.  
17 Descartes embodied his political theory in real life as he moved almost freely throughout the 
European countryside searching for a location in which he saw fit to settle. He first lived in 
France, then the Netherlands, and ultimately in Sweden, where he died in February, 1650.  
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seem peculiar, but his philosophy was a foundational element of eighteenth-century 
political philosophy. 
Descartes’s fundamental contribution to political philosophy was his theory of 
Man. First and most important was Man’s free will. While more politically oriented 
contemporaries defined “property” or “security” as the most sacred possession of 
humans, Descartes believed Man’s most prized possession was a God-like free will: 
“Free will is in itself the noblest thing we have, since it makes us in a way equal to 
God.”18 This position, according to Timothy Reiss, was “wholly different from what 
could have been thought before.”19 Descartes’s free will theory, and perhaps his entire 
metaphysics, was completely reliant on his dualism.20 There was the physical world—
full of material objects and occurrences that one could use the senses to detect—and the 
world of one’s mind and soul—the mental process of understanding the physical. In order 
to make free will truly free, Descartes determined that the motion of one’s will must be 
unhindered. As for the physical world, or “body,” it was a necessary aspect of reality 
because it was Descartes’s belief, as Steven Nadler states, that “there is and can be no 
truly empty space; matter—extension—is everywhere and the universe is a plenum.”21 
                                                
18 Quoted from a letter to Queen Christina in November, 1647. Noa Naaman-Zauderer, 
Descartes’s Deontological Turn: Reason, Will and Virtue in the Later Writings, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 131. 
19 Reiss, “Descartes, the Palatine, and the Thirty Years War,” 127. Reiss defends this compelling 
statement by arguing that the concept is not found in Montaigne, and that prior to Descartes, 
human free will was always considered subordinate to God’s, thus never relatable.   
20 For a discussion of Descartes’s notion of free will as it relates to metaphysics, see Nye, Princess 
and the Philosopher, 74. 
21The Philosopher, The Priest, 113-116. 
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Within this world, Man experienced only “physical things and minds or souls capable of 
knowing those things.”22  
A deeper understanding of the mind and body’s ability in Man is necessary in 
order to locate the influence of Descartes in the political philosophy of Locke and 
Hobbes. On the ability of the mind, one must look to the human relationship between 
God, Man, and truth, which Descartes explored in his first three Meditations. He began 
by doubting the existence of “all things, and especially of material objects” in his First 
Meditation.23 Using a “skeptically driven epistemology to systematically strip down the 
world,” Descartes reduced his thought to a state where no previously held notion 
existed—his nature.24 By searching for an ounce of reality in his Second Meditation, 
Descartes concluded that beyond reasonable doubt, he himself did, in truth, exist.25 From 
this first principle (that he existed) he was then able to confront the existence of God, the 
“sovereign being,” in his third Meditation. 
Descartes had to first argue against the skeptic’s argument that human 
subjectivity created God, and that God did not pre-exist. He did this by arguing that 
because the reality of truth is undeniable, a realm of perfection must infinitely exist (“Yet, 
                                                
22 Princess and the Philosopher, 12. 
23René Descartes, The Meditations, and Selections from the Principles of Philosophy of 
Descaetes translated by John Veitch, (Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox, 1853), 11. For a 
thorough and clear summarization of the thesis of Meditations, see Descartes’s System of Natural 
Philosophy, 28-30. 
24Descartes’s System of Natural Philosophy, 28. 
25At the moment Descartes concludes that he exists, there is a moment of doubt. He considers the 
possibility that he was being deceived by some sort of evil demon, but refutes that notion by 
stating, “he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something.” 
For a brief and clear description of this doubt see Nadler, 101-2. For Descartes’s surety about his 
existence, see Descartes’s System of Natural Philosophy, 74. 
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on looking more closely into the matter, I discover that this cannot be…although there 
were potentially in my nature much that was not as yet actually in it, still all these 
excellences make not the slightest approach to the idea I have of the Deity, in whom there 
is no perfection merely potentially [but all actually] existent.”26) God dwells in this realm 
of perfection.27  Descartes supported the existence of God with the following statement: 
“I could not possibly be of such a nature as I am, and yet have in my mind the idea of a 
God, if God did not in reality exist.”28 The “slight conception” of God and his existence, 
“though incomparably less perfect,” was based on Man’s ability to discover truth. For 
Descartes, God was but an entity composed of unlimited truth.  
Descartes’s belief in the potential of Man to uncover truth was a large break from 
contemporary philosophy.29 Within European intellectual thought, the Protestant 
Reformation, which promoted the idea that individuals ought to have an active personal 
relationship with God, had only occurred in the previous century; the idea that everyone 
possessed an aspect of God’s power was radical.  If Man possessed a God-like free will 
                                                
26Meditations, 47. 
27Piotr Hoffman, The Quest for Power: Hobbes, Descartes, and the Emergence of Modernity 
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1996), 133. 
28Meditations, 52. 
29For more on the Aristotelians and their understanding of the ability to access Truth, see Jorge 
Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 35. And for his separation from St. 
Bonaventure and St. Augustine, see Ibid., 46. Schall states: “Aristotle was willing to admit the 
importance and necessity of sense knowledge as a bridge to reality[…] but even though Aristotle 
recognized the need and validity of sensory knowledge as a conduit to reality, he still remained 
at one with Plato in acknowledging the primacy of theoretic knowledge, the knowledge of things 
‘that cannot be otherwise,’” see “Cartesianism and Political Theory,” 265. Also, The Imposition 
of Method, 12, discusses “transitional figures” during the seventeenth century that did not 
necessarily adopt fully “modern” thinking. This point greatly expands the potential for 
scholarship to properly identify thinkers and mindsets during this period. 
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along with the ability to discover truth, how could Man not be God? God, according to 
Descartes, did not have a dualistic nature, he was one with the world. Man, on the other 
hand, is only connected to the physical world by the mind experiencing it. The natural 
reality of the human condition, something philosophers had confronted for ages, was not 
seen as a disadvantage by Descartes; it was simply an aspect of reality.  
Though the infinite possibility of truth is within Man, there existed the potential 
that one could “lose the rights it gives us through timidity.”30 “Timidity” was the 
influence on Man of any forces (including passion) that opposed reason during the 
thinking process.31 Rather than denounce the tendency, Descartes suggested that some 
may simply not “know how to use that good sense [reason] properly.”32 With his 
philosophy, Descartes believed himself to have found truth that did not depend on 
support from “elements furnished by faith.” Truths of the physical world would become 
self-evident, he argued, once one adopted his Method—the precursor of theoretical 
sciences.33  
Descartes’s separation of mind and body ushered in a nuanced approach to 
political society. If Man’s mind had divine attributes, according to Descartes, then the 
human understanding of the world must possess at least some knowledge of the general 
direction of truth. Government, as it was understood by both Hobbes and Locke, is an 
                                                
30“Descartes, the Palatine, and the Thirty Years War,” 126-7. 
31 Schouls does an impressive job analyzing Descartes’s concept of reason; see Imposition of 
Method, 30-52. 
32 “Descartes, the Palatine, and the Thirty Years War,” 125. 
33 Imposition of Method, 41. 
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aspect of the physical world so fundamentally necessary to human society that only an 
occurrence of divine rationality could have produced it. Thus, to best understand 
government, these philosophers examined the existence of Man during the state of nature 
to search for “efficient causation” of government.34  In other words, these philosophers 
did not look to the state of nature as a source for practical governance, rather, they looked 
to the state of nature to find the rationalistic essence of government. 
 
International and domestic warfare persisted throughout seventeenth-century Europe as 
armies defended individual monarchs’ divine right to rule. But in England, “duty toward 
God gave way to the rights of men,” and thus “a new ideology, a new rationale, a new 
set of fictions was necessary to justify a government in which the authority of kings stood 
below that of the people or their representatives.”35 Individuals saw that the king was not 
“absolute in fact as in theory.”36 It became accepted as a British truism that the practical 
authority of the king, sanctioned by God Himself, was now below the authority of the 
people. The English Revolution (1642-1649), which occurred almost exactly between 
the publication of Descartes’s Meditations and that of Hobbes’s Leviathan, left political 
rhetoric in turmoil as divine right was challenged not by others who claimed the position, 
but by an increasing number of people who doubted the reality of the divine right of 
monarchs. The king’s divine right had been challenged by the Parliamentarians, and now, 
                                                
34 The Philosopher, The Priest, 115. 
35 Inventing the People, 56. Morgan does admit that the “idea” of popular sovereignty was not 
“wholly novel… but the change of emphasis [towards people] was crucial.” 
36 Politics and the Passions, 50. 
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as Edmund Morgan has argued, there existed a void to be filled. Who fulfilled the divine 
purpose of government if not the monarch? Could the people, mere peasants even, 
technically have more “divine right” than the king? The concept of popular sovereignty 
in western governance was born: “the people are the governed; they are also, at least 
fictionally, the governors, at once subjects and rulers.”37  
Thomas Hobbes: The Sovereign and State 
As Hobbes stated in Leviathan, “the skill of making, and maintaining 
commonwealths, consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry; not (as 
tennis-play) in practice only: which rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that 
have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method [sic] to find out.”38 
Hobbes, like Descartes, set out to perfect what he considered the shortcomings of 
previous political philosophers.39 Descartes created the first rational and, for all intents 
and purposes, relatively clear description of Man “in nature”; Hobbes was simply among 
the first philosophers to find out what this new depiction of Man meant for political 
inquiry.40 
                                                
37 Ibid., 38-9. 
38 Leviathan, 139. 
39 Hobbes “expressed a low estimate of the way previous moral philosophers had dealt with 
natural law and disparaged them for their erroneous opinions on the nature of right and wrong 
and for their endless disputes on moral questions in which they contradicted both one another 
and themselves.” Victoria Kahn, Neil Saccamano, and Daniela Coli eds., Politics and the 
Passions, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 38-9; for more on this topic see Politics 
and the Passions, 47, 128.   
40Descartes’s System of Natural Philosophy, 25; Perez Zagorin, Hobbes and the Law of Nature, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 13.  
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 Hobbes looked to the natural human world for truth without simultaneously 
denying the existence God, similar to Descartes.41 Timothy Reiss, in his semi-
philosophical article on history and Descartes, stated that after Descartes’s work was 
published in the 1640s, Hobbes stated 
like the spirit of God moving over the deep in the second verse of Genesis, the 
true philosopher must let his ‘reason move upon the deep of his [own] cogitations 
and experience…’ It was almost as if the very processes of reason had been 
hypostatized into their object of study: here the object was the state and civil 
society.42 
 
This was merely the metaphysics behind Hobbes’s political treatise, however—his 
starting point. Descartes directly influenced the history of ontological and metaphysical 
philosophy, but his work seldom went beyond the self. Hobbes’s Leviathan picked up 
where Meditations left off by considering the natural state of human interaction.  
Following Descartes, Hobbes saw little difference in the nature of individual 
humans: “the difference between Man, and Man, is not so considerable, as that one Man 
can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as 
he.”43 The free will that humans naturally possessed, according Hobbes, must originally 
have produced a perpetual violent war “of all men, against all men.” The equality of free 
will in nature allowed Man to do whatever he felt was necessary, and thus no one could 
be safe when “the way of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, 
                                                
41 For this history of disputes pertaining to the question of God in the natural world during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century, see Descartes’s System of Natural Philosophy, 76. 
42“Descartes, the Palatine, and the Thirty Years War,” 127. 
43Leviathan, 82. Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 34-6. For more on Hobbes’s state of nature as a state of war, see The 
Quest for Power, 53. 
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supplant, or repel the other.”44 For Hobbes, it was specifically for the purpose of security 
that political communities were created. Determining that this original life was 
unacceptable for the human’s mind and body, Hobbes argued that a transition must have 
occurred in society when individuals began to cooperate. Both the natural reason and 
passion of Man played a pivotal role in bringing these original communities out of that 
natural state: human passion left one searching for peace, and human reason then guided 
individuals to agreements establishing the peace.45 Cooperation, however, was only the 
first step to creating civil society, the end goal of all government to Hobbes.  
Hobbes’s definition of civil society is perhaps the most abstract aspect of 
Leviathan, but it did rest on his clear and concise description of the laws of nature. 
Hobbes believed natural laws were “properly called laws” because they were “delivered 
in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things.” 46 As well, natural law differed 
from natural right: “right” was Man’s ability to do “any thing, which in his own 
judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means” of surviving.  A law of 
nature, in contrast, was a “precept, or general rule, found out by reason” that was opposed 
to Man’s natural right.47 In other words, in the state of nature, natural right was simply 
the god-like free will all humans possess—to act as they see fit; the laws of nature, 
                                                
44Leviathan, 66. 
45 Leviathan, 86. Although Zagorin does not go into detail on page 33, this is an obvious example 
of Hobbes’s concurrence with Descartes’s dualism. “He denied that the passions are inherently 
wicked or prove that men are evil by nature” and simply understood it as an aspect of the human 
condition.  See Hobbes and the Law of Nature, 33. Quest for Power, 22-3, 43-2. 
46 Leviathan 106. 
47 Ibid., 86. 
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however, were innate to the human condition, similar to passion, but uniform and 
objective throughout humanity.48  
To Hobbes, the fundamental law of nature was that man “ought to endeavor 
peace.”49 In nature, humans hesitate to work with one another due to the fear that one 
may be deceived because of another’s natural right to do as they pleased: where 
“everyman has a Right to everything,” and thus everyone lived in a state of perpetual 
war, it would be a “general rule of Reason…to seek Peace, and follow it.” But for 
Hobbes, natural laws were “but conclusions, or theorems concerning what conduceth to 
the conservation and defense of [Man]”; there was nothing aside from Man’s desire for 
peace and to preserve his own life that caused the use of natural law. Thus the second 
Law— “That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and 
defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to [Freedom]; and 
be contended with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men 
against himselfe”—resolved the problem of how to seek peace in nature. It was derived 
from Hobbes’s belief that only by individuals working together could a society be taken 
out of nature. Similar to the Golden Rule, in Hobbes’s description of civil society, 
individuals actually ‘do to others as they wish done to them.’50 But in order for this to 
                                                
48 Hobbes and the Law of Nature, 42. 
49 Hobbes describes the two following laws in Leviathan, 87. 
50 Leviathan, 87, 104. Yishaiya Abosch has also considered Hobbes’s presentation of the golden 
rule.  See “An Exceptional Power: Equity in Thomas Hobbes’s Dialogue on the Common Law” 
in Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 1 (March 2013) pp. 18-31; 27.  Also, see The Quest 
for Power, 39. 
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occur, and for natural laws to transform into civil laws, Hobbes suggested that there must 
exist “trust.”  
 “Trust” was crucial to the process by which a society rose out of nature. He did 
not use the word “trust” differently from the twenty-first century definition: Webster’s 
Dictionary defines trust as “firm belief in the honesty, reliability, etc. of another; faith.”51 
Hobbes simply extended the definition to include human interaction in nature: “In the 
condition of meer nature…upon any reasonable suspition, [trust] is Voyd.”52 Without 
trust, no social circumstance “where there is [no] feare of not performance on either part” 
could theoretically exist.53  “In a civil estate,” however, “where there is a Power set to 
constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more 
reasonable.”54 In following the logic of Hobbes’s concept of trust, no legitimate civil 
society could occur without it. While humans may trust their own subjective relationship 
to the laws of nature, they cannot trust that of others. Therefore, in order to initiate some 
form of civility, a situation must have occurred in which “a multitude of Men, are made 
one person, when they are by one Man, or one person, represented.”55 Behold Hobbes’s 
vision of how a commonwealth comes to be. That it was deemed necessary by Hobbes 
to mention the moment when a plurality of voices were reduced “unto one will: which is 
as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person,” 
                                                
51Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus Second Edition, (New York, Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 676.  
52 Leviathan, 91. 
53 Ibid., 95. 
54 Ibid., 91. 
55 Ibid., 109. 
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demonstrated a new phase of confidence in the universality of political discourse.57Once 
all voices are combined into a single will, the singular voice of a people is possible. The 
society Hobbes imagines is ideal, to him, because it removes “the feare of not 
performance.” But it could only appear once “there is a Power” to restrain Man’s 
unlimited free will.  
 The entity that possessed the “Power set to constrain” was Hobbes’ sovereign. 
Man could not have a peaceful coexistence if everyone possessed unlimited right: How 
could humans expect to work reasonably with one another if trust did not bind their 
obligations? Hobbes’s sovereign possessed the necessary power to perform the task of 
ensuring peace. The sovereign, as “either one, or more, or all,” of course, did not 
naturally have this amount of power, however.58 The creation of sovereignty required a 
voluntary sacrifice of Man’s free will. Only after humans “confer all their power and 
strength upon one man,” could sovereignty emerge. The relationship between the 
sovereign and people is clear: “he that carrieth this [Power], is called Sovereign…and 
everyone besides, his Subject.”59 In the final section of Chapter XVIII, Hobbes confronts 
those who may object to his philosophy and argue “that the condition of subjects is very 
miserable.”60 He replies that the power of sovereigns is similar in all kinds of 
                                                
57 Ibid., 114. 
58 Ibid., 123. The full quote is stated after he explains the three forms of government—
Aristocracy, Monarchy, and Democracy—and reads, “Other kind of commonwealth there can be 
none: for either one, or more, or all, must have the sovereign power (which I have shown to be 
indivisible) entire.” 
59 Ibid., 114-115. 
60 Ibid., 122. 
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governmental systems, not just monarchy: “if they be perfect enough to protect [their 
constituents], [power] is the same.” The system must receive the faith and free will of 
each individual it presides over to provide this perfect protection. 
Does Hobbes then assert that the role of Man was that of blind submission to 
authority? Not quite. The subject of Hobbes’s commonwealth is “free,” by which he 
meant free of opposition from “external impediments of motion.”61 The only thing that 
prevented subjects from freely moving throughout the world was confrontation with 
“some external body,” that is another commonwealth. Within the dominion of their own 
commonwealth, they were free to move and live life freely according to the “artificial 
chains, called civil laws.”62 When discussing the power balance of subjects and these 
artificial chains, Hobbes argued that there exists something called the “true liberty of a 
subject.” These “true liberties” are similar to the claim in the American Declaration of 
Independence that all Men have the right to “life” and “liberty.” A Man may justly oppose 
a sovereign who asks an individual to “kill, wound, or maim himself”; nor can the 
sovereign expect one to confess to a crime one has committed, and thus willingly dispose 
of his “liberty.”63 “The obligation of subject to the sovereign, is understood to last as 
long, and no longer” than the sovereign protects the lives of subjects. These events only 
concerned specific occasions, however, and would not dissolve the entire sovereign 
entity.  
                                                
61 Ibid., 139. 
62 Ibid., 141. 
63 Ibid., 144. 
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Hobbes understood government as an organic event:  “For by [Nature] is created 
that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or a State, which is but an Artificiall Man 
[sic]” with many parts: “Sovereignty…an artificial soul,” officials are “artificial joints,” 
“reward and punishment….the nerves,” “wealth and riches….strength,” 
“counsellors…the memory,” “equity and laws…artificial reason and will,” and finally, 
“the pacts and covenants…first made, set together, and united, resemble [God’s creation 
of Man].”64 Sovereignty, the “soul,” was the most divine part of Hobbes’s state, but how 
could one’s individual soul be accounted for in a system of governance?65 For Hobbes, 
the monarchical system of government simplified this predicament: sovereignty resided 
in the monarch’s soul, the divine appendage of his or her body. 
A counter position emerged amongst Hobbes’ contemporaries, however, who 
argued it was the people’s soul which is sovereign. The increasing faith in the reasoning 
faculty of Man during the seventeenth century came to fruition in English governance 
through the ascendancy of Parliament. The king was interpreted as the earthly 
representation of God:  
Like God he was omnipresent, for in himself he constituted the “body politic” 
over which he ruled. But like the son whom God sent to redeem mankind, he was 
man as well as God; he had a “body natural” as well as his body politic, and the 
two were inseparable like the persons of the Trinity.66 
                                                
64 Ibid., 7. The kind of commonwealth varied among three choices for Hobbes. His particular 
choice of State was “Monarchy,” but he does concede “Democracy” and “Aristocracy” to have 
their worth as well. According to Hobbes, monarchy was the best because it had the capability to 
best “produce the peace, and the security of the people. 
65 For the opinion that the “soul” is “depicted here as being idolatrous,” see Subverting the 
Leviathan, 132. 
66 Inventing the People, 17. 
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But just as God was slowly being replaced by Man’s insurgence as the only arbiter of 
truth, monarchs began to lose their place as the ultimate source of state authority after 
the English Civil War. By time of the Glorious Revolution in England later in the 
seventeenth century, the throne’s authority became dependent on Parliament as James II 
was replaced by William and Mary in 1689. Not only did Parliament’s symbolic power 
increase—signified by their action of “hiring” the king—but their systematic power grew 
as well, in that “the freedom of speech and debates of proceedings in Parliament ought 
not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.”67 Parliament 
had become unquestionable as the governmental embodiment of the people. And thus by 
the late seventeenth century, “the legislature” became “the fundamental power in 
society…the supreme power of the commonwealth.”68 That the people developed into a 
legitimate source of political authority by the eighteenth century is a certainty, but 
                                                
67Specifically, “And whereas…his Highness the prince of Orange (whom it hath pleased 
Almighty God to make the glorious instrument of delivering this kingdom from popery and 
arbitrary) …caused letters to be written to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal being Protestants, 
and other letters to the several counties, cities, universities, boroughs and cinque ports, for the 
choosing of such persons to represent them…being now assembled in a full and free 
representative of this nation…” “English Bill of Rights 1689,” The Avalon Project, 
avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/England, last accessed 3/7/2017.   
68 J. R. Pole, Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic, 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1966), 18. This quotation is actually from two different 
sentences on the same page, but because they both related to the legislature I found it acceptable 
that they be conjoined.  The first one describes Locke’s endorsement of a Whig government: “He 
saw his primary task as that of establishing beyond question the right of the majority to originate 
the legislative power, the fundamental power in society.”  The next describes Locke’s Second 
Treatise: “When he arrives at the appropriate point he is ready to make a full and extreme 
assertion: the legislative power is the supreme power of the commonwealth.”  
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defining exactly who the people were or how they expressed their power was 
problematic, even for John Locke.69 
John Locke: The People and State 
Hobbes envisioned a rationalistic scenario in which humans created the 
sovereign; John Locke’s theory of government used an empirical approach to attempt to 
ensure that the trust between Man and sovereign was sustained. Locke, like Descartes, 
was a successful epistemological philosopher.70 Descartes’s “unlimited trust in natural 
reason” had a great influence on Locke’s basic understanding of human intellect, which 
stemmed from his faith in reason as the umpire of truth.71 Locke “repeatedly taunt[ed] 
the upholders of orthodoxy for their lack of confidence in the truth of their doctrines, 
challenging them to put their doctrines to the test of reason.”72 For Locke, reason is God’s 
                                                
69 Ibid., 19. Pole considers a brief history of the location of legislative power. “The Levellers had 
lodged it with the economically self-supporting section of the population whom they defined as 
‘the people’…Harrington divided it carefully, giving popular assembly only the right to resolve, 
not initiate or debate.” 
70 Seldom do Locke scholars consider the influence Descartes had on Locke, although scholars 
have confronted the task. Peter Myers argues: “Taken in itself, [Descartes’s] account of a 
radically individualistic native consciousness could not support Locke’s descriptions of a social 
and contentious state of nature.” I disagree and instead read Descartes more as a metaphysician 
laying out the groundwork prior to social circumstance. Meyers allows for my insertion when he 
later states: “The specific character of the Lockean state of nature is not fully manifest or actual 
in the beginning, but instead emerges in a natural necessary process of development.” Therefore, 
Descartes could still influence Locke’s thoughts on the beginning; see “Between Divine and 
Human Sovereignty: The State of Nature and the Basis of Locke’s Political Thought, Polity, Vol. 
27, No. 4 (Summer, 1995), pp. 629-649; 634-5. For more on a pre-social Locke, see Ruth Grant, 
“John Locke on Custom’s Power and Reason’s Authority” in The Review of Politics, Vol. 74, 
No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp.607-629; 608. Perhaps the most extensive work has been done by Peter 
Schouls. His Imposition of Method is an outstanding example of Descartes’s influence on Locke. 
71 Imposition of Method, 8. 
72 “Custom’s Power and Reason’s Authority,” 614. John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, 
(London: Printed for R. Butler, 1821), 209: “God, who hath given the world to men in common, 
hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience.” 
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most sacred gift to mankind; reason is “itself a moral obligation and only by employing 
[it] can we reach a proper understanding of both duty and faith.”73 Although 
commonalities in the essential function of reason are found in all three philosophers, 
Locke’s faith in the universality of reason had a more extreme influence on his theory of 
government. His depiction of the state of nature ultimately produced a political 
philosophy that favored an individual-oriented concept of sovereignty, rather than the 
state-oriented version conceived by Hobbes. 
On the actual concept of “sovereignty,” Locke was relatively quiet. Peter Meyers 
asserts that Locke’s hesitancy to discuss the topic of sovereignty was a result of the 
philosopher’s rational understanding of Man. Meyers notes: “the principle of pure human 
sovereignty requires that we refuse to submit to any rule not of our own making[.]” A 
government that does not provide a systematic role for the people “delegitimates the 
governance of reason itself, which aims at discovering, not making, the rules to which 
we are properly subject.”74 Building on Meyers’ point, since Locke considered a 
                                                
73“Custom’s Power and Reason’s Authority”, 620. Recently John William Tate, in “Locke, God, 
and Civil Society: Response to Stanton,” refutes Timothy Stanton’s opinion that God is the 
central piece of Locke’s entire political theory. Instead, Tate argues Locke sought to remove God 
from the actions of Man. I consider Locke as secular as possible for an educated seventeenth-
century intellectual. God’s existence was described in terms of such omnipresence that it was 
both impossible and possible. For Tate’s response, see “Locke, God, and Civil Society: Response 
to Stanton” in Political Theory, Vol. 40, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 222-228 (New York: Sage 
Publications, Inc., 2012). For more on theology and how it related to Locke’s theory of 
government, see Roland Marden, “’Who Shall Be Judge:’ John Locke’s Two Treatises of 
Government and the Problem of Sovereignty,” Contribution to the History of Concepts, Vol. 2, 
No.1 (March 2006), pp.59-81; 72. 
74“Between Divine and Human Sovereignty,” 646. 
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government to be legitimate only if it gained the consent of the people, the essence of 
Locke’s political theory is to define a systematic role for the people: 
people…have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their 
power…they should exercise the power of making laws, either at certain set times, 
or when there is need of it, when they are hindered by any force from what is so 
necessary to the society, and wherein the safety and preservation of the people 
consists, the people have a right to remove it by force.75  
 
“Revolutionary logic”—that legitimate states could be established, and dissolved, only 
by the people themselves—is the creation of Locke. 
 Locke’s initial description of the state of nature was quite similar to Hobbes’s; 
unlimited free will was a fundamental truth of the human condition, according to both 
philosophers. Locke introduced nature in Two Treatises as “what state all men are 
naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of 
their possessions and persons, as they think fit.”76 Similar to Hobbes, Locke argued that 
the “only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the 
bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join [together]…for their 
comfortable, safe and peaceable living amongst another.”77 Locke went a step further 
than Hobbes, however, in replacing the former’s focus on the preservation of life with a 
new emphasis on property, and the preservation thereof, as the “chief end” of civil 
society.78 Once this community was formed, “every man, by consenting with 
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others…puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society, to submit to the 
determination of the majority.” Whereas Hobbes looked to an individual (the sovereign) 
to embody the will of the whole, Locke argued that Man ought to only submit his 
unlimited free will to the will of the majority. 
Locke was rather critical of a pure monarchical system—one in which individuals 
sacrificed their own will to that of a single Man. Monarchy, Locke considered, was the 
“most obvious and simple” of the ways government could be formed.79  In earlier periods 
of the state of nature, there had not yet been much complexity to life—it was one 
individual’s will versus another’s. In such small communities, 
The equality of a simple poor way of living, confining their desires within the 
narrow bounds of each man’s small property, made few controversies, and so no 
need of many laws to decide them, or variety of officers to superintend the 
process, or look after the execution of justice, where there were but few 
trespasses, and few offenders.80   
 
Locke suggested that if it had not been for this first simple monarchical political 
organization, “young societies could not have subsisted.”81 Without such leaders to 
conduct these infant commonwealths, and “without such nursing fathers tender and 
careful of the public weal [well-being], all governments would have sunk under the 
weakness of infirmities of their infancy.” But that was a different age from today, said 
Locke; once princes learned “to have distinct and separate interests from their people,” 
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it became necessary to formulate a new government and evolve the system—an evolution 
Hobbes had not considered  
 In chapter XI, “Of the Extent of the Legislative Power,” Locke exposed the true 
colors of his philosophy. It is here, in the first chapter after Locke established the “Forms 
of a Commonwealth,” that he explained his concept of “supreme authority.” Chapter XI 
begins with Locke stating that (as described in his previous chapter) the “first and 
fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative 
power.”82 The legislature’s purpose was none other than the “preservation of the society,” 
and it acted as the land’s “supreme power.” Locke defined supreme power as the ultimate 
creator of “law” within a given community, an ability no entity could have without 
consent from the society. It was “ridiculous” to Locke for a state to create laws without 
that consent.83 Chapter XI thus set out to explain how a legislature is to act as the agent 
of the consenting society. 
  Locke made a significant leap from his contemporaries in this chapter by 
equating supreme state authority with the people. But he admitted that this system was 
paradoxical in its essence: “though it be the supreme power in every commonwealth,” 
the legislative is not “absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people.”84 
The government was supreme until it threatened the “lives and fortunes of the people.” 
Locke then spent the most time in this chapter defining what he meant by “fortunes.” He 
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stated that no legislative power could take the property of its subjects without their 
consent: “And to let us see, that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not 
arbitrary by being absolute.”85 The state’s ultimate power, the legislative, ought to be 
absolute, but not arbitrary—which he equated with “despotic power.”86  
A despot is one who holds absolute power, but according to Locke, despotism 
could exist only in two cases. The more obvious case that Locke spent little time 
discussing was the master and slave relationship: a slave from a “just war” was a slave 
until “he be once allowed to be master of his own life,” at which time “the despotical, 
arbitrary power of his master ceases.” The other case concerned subjects within a 
political society who allowed a despotic government to establish itself: “it is the effect 
only of forfeiture…for [only by] having quitted reason, which God hath given to be the 
rule betwixt man and man…and having renounced the way of peace” could mankind 
allow such a government to exist. As Locke concluded Chapter XI, he stated four simple 
rules that a state’s supreme authority ought to follow: it should govern by laws that are 
established without the interest of particular subjects; the laws established should be 
designed “for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people”; it should only raise 
taxes (take property) through consent; and it cannot relieve itself of its duties and place 
its power anywhere “but where the people have” already placed it.87 
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 In conclusion, for Locke, the prerogative of the government should be one with 
the prerogative of its subjects; and if this is not so, “the people under [t]his government 
are not a society of rational creatures, entered into a community for their mutual 
good.”88Although Locke’s work has since been praised for his general inclusion of 
property, it became increasingly unclear in the century that followed Two Treatises’ 
publication precisely how the prerogative of “rational creatures” ought to be calculated 
into governance.89  
If the “state of nature” metaphor was to yield any practical lessons, political 
theorists must first understand the Man who experienced it. Descartes was most 
influential in developing the concept of Man as a thinking creature who had the ability 
to attain perfect truth. Through an analysis of both the mind’s and the body’s experiences 
in nature, both Locke and Hobbes logically concluded that the state of nature was 
undesirable for Man. To protect individuals from an unending chaos, both philosophers 
determined there must have been a natural and rational formation of a powerful entity 
to bring mankind out of the undesirable natural state—and that entity was government. 
For all three philosophers, government was a natural aspect of human society—part of 
the physical world—and thus possessed truth for the human mind to observe. 
But there was more to Leviathan and Two Treatises than these foundational 
agreements, and the discrepancies found in their discourse went on to produce two ends 
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of the conceptual spectrum of political sovereignty. The disagreement concerned who 
the sovereign actually is. Hobbes was clear about this: Man created government, and that 
government was the sovereign. Whether it be a legislature or a king, the government 
created out of nature was the sovereign state. Writing from the Whig perspective during 
the Glorious Revolution in England, Locke was more skeptical of tyrannical sovereigns. 
Since it was Man that ultimately held the positions in government, an involved citizenry 
assured that a state would not usurp its power and act in too disconnected of a manner 
from the people. Locke’s desire to include the people shows two things: first, that Locke 
ultimately did accept the government’s composite power as sovereign. And second, that 
the theoretical power of the people had grown exponentially since Hobbes’ work.  
Less than a century after Locke’s death, at the time of Vermont’s tumultuous 
infancy, the discourse of a “sovereign people” emerged. 
“Whether in the Wild Woods and Uncultivated Waste of America” 
As with much of the writing that comes from the pens of intellectuals, there was 
a slow percolation of these philosophical ideas into the common framework of thought 
in the colonies. Political excerpts from the newspapers of New England, where many of 
the future inhabitants of Vermont were born, provide an overview of the contemporary 
popular concept of sovereignty.90 The abstract metaphor of the state of nature, used by 
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Hobbes and Locke, played a crucial role in the discussion of sovereignty in eighteenth-
century British-American newspapers. Through a revived interest in original charters, 
and a print community that disseminated political tracts of Lockean and Hobbesian 
ideology, the state of nature settled into its place as a trope of British-American political 
discourse. But the “state of nature” is only mentioned in this literature as a theoretical 
state, not one that can be experienced in reality. 
In the Boston Evening Post, for example, an anonymous writer identified as 
“Your Lordship’s most obedient humble Servant” explained how charters were 
fundamental to understanding ultimate political authority.91 According to “Servant,” 
charters had been established in the Americas to lift the migrants out of the state of nature. 
The charters—established by “those whose forefathers fled into the wilderness to avoid 
the intolerable oppression and arbitrary power of the faithless Stuarts”—Servant 
considered “sacred.” Once in the wilderness of America, there was “no civil government 
but what they form’d themselves.” By selecting “agents” to represent them, Servant’s 
forefathers became bound and protected by a greater power (Great Britain) under these 
charters. By 1765, however, the state’s increase in taxation to replace costs from the 
French and Indian War caused Servant to question the treatment of subjects on behalf of 
the state. New England, Servant argued, had “during the course of the [French and Indian 
War] furnish’d a reasonable quota both of men & money, [and] exerted themselves to 
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the utmost.” Britain sending troops overseas and then expecting the colonies to pay for 
it “violat[ed colonial] charters,” which guaranteed protection under the British sovereign 
state. Not only was the government’s action unnecessary, Servant argued, but the 
decision hindered colonial progress:  
[sending troops] creat[ed] a large expence, to carry and support a useless, nay I 
am sorry to say, a dissolute set of men, to live in idleness among them, and 
deprave the manners of the people, which is of no small importance in infant 
colonies, when the utmost industry is necessary to their own well-being, and their 
utility to their mother country. 
 
That the taxation was done without colonial consent was the final point made by Servant: 
“If at any time there is a necessity of raising money from the colonies, let it be intimated 
by the several Governors to their respective Assemblies.” While the author explained 
that the systematic event of representation would prevent future controversy, Servant 
concluded with an abstract gesture. The author requested the Ministry to act in “his 
majesty’s interest, to rule in the hearts of a free people in America as well as in England.” 
The Ministry was expected always to act in the interest of the king, which Servant now 
argued was synonymous with the “hearts” of the people. The wills of the people and 
sovereign state were expected to be one, according to Servant, although authority 
remained strictly with the state. 
 As colonists paid close attention to the political crisis of the late 1760s and early 
1770s, a sense of disconnection from government left the people wondering how to act. 
To clarify the proper procedures in 1771, “Mutius Scaevola” followed the methodology 
used by philosophers to imagine the circumstances that had required charters for his 
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ancestors in the first place.92 Scaevola argued in the Boston Gazette that charters had 
been formed out of “necessity [by] the several legislative bodies of Great-Britain, Ireland 
and the British Colonies.” All colonies were “perfectly distinct, and entirely independent 
upon each other,” yet “connected only by their allegiance to their common sovereign, 
whose common interest is their common prosperity, and whose supreme duty and 
constant inclination is their common and indiscriminate protection.” This position, he 
defended, “stands in fact & must stand firm, having the law of nature for its foundation.” 
Drawing on both Hobbesian and Lockean theory, Scaevola argued that to bring people 
out of nature was directly intertwined with their own consent: “there is an essential 
difference between, requesting and demanding; the former is perfectly consistent with 
liberty, the other, altogether destructive of it.” Any “alteration of the established 
government…without the consent of the people…our gallant ancestors would have 
waded thro’ seas of blood to combat.” Scaevola argued that once a government arbitrarily 
alters the terms of governance, it “reduces the subject again to a state of nature, which 
being a state of war.”  
By 1774, it appeared increasingly evident throughout the British empire that the 
thirteen American colonies would revolt. The outcry of the colonists during the previous 
decade had fallen on deaf ears, and had now developed into a crisis of sovereignty. An 
excerpt “offered to the Consideration of thinking Men” in the New-Hampshire Gazette 
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noted just how powerful the authority of the people was.93 According to this author, the 
public was in an uproar due to the British “Legislators [who] endeavor to take away and 
destroy the property of the People, or to reduce them to Slavery under arbitrary Power.” 
The power of the people in British thought was now so immense that if “ill treated, and 
contrary to right, [they] will be ready on any Occasion to ease themselves of a Burden 
that fit heavy upon them.” According to an increasing number of colonists, the 
legislatures of the British system, whom Locke expected to be responsible for relieving 
the disconnect between state and people, were in practice legitimated strictly by the title 
of their office and not the merit of their actions. The author did not consider colonists the 
rebels: “those, whoever they be, who by Force break through and by Force justify their 
Violation…are truly and properly Rebels.” Once it was made clear to the colonists that 
George III was but a man who “by Force justify their Violation,” his sovereign power 
was dissolved.  
The people individually could not govern the colonies, for that would be chaos; 
and Great Britain could no longer rule, since that was now defined as political slavery. 
Although the creation of a new sovereign state—the United States—had begun, it was 
not completed until nearly fifteen years later. Between 1775 and 1783, British America 
(and much of Europe for that matter) was in a state of war; the question of sovereignty 
was in suspense as individuals grasped whatever authority they felt best secured their 
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lives. There was, however, a new truth of governance that was found in nearly every state 
constitution: “the people have a right, by common consent, to change [government], and 
take such measures as to them may appear necessary to promote their safety and 
happiness.”94  
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CHAPTER 2: THE STATE OF NATURE IN THE HAMPSHIRE GRANTS 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the “state of nature” became a common 
trope well before the revolutionary-era discussion of sovereignty in British America. The 
physical surroundings of authors who wrote about the relationship between nature and 
sovereignty, however, seldom resembled a truly natural environment. Instead, authors 
and philosophers were forced to envision an ideal natural state.  Some, like the 
pseudonymous author “Servant,” recalled their “forefathers [who] fled into the 
wilderness;” others, such as the commentator “Mutius Scaevola,” grounded their 
arguments in “the law of nature.”  
As the relationship between Britain and the colonies deteriorated, colonists felt 
that the empire was literally casting them back into a state of nature. Yet, there still 
existed a “Civill Power erected over the [people],” as Hobbes defined it, throughout 
major cities where newspapers and common knowledge flourished.95 Benjamin Franklin 
noted a differentiation between American civil order and Native American society, 
which, as he believed, contained “no force…no prisons…no officers to compel 
obedience, or inflict punishment.”96 His comments express the current understanding of 
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civil society: it was only possible through a present and consistent relationship between 
the people and authority. According to this definition, Jefferson asserted that a civil 
power still existed in American cities, even without British control. Residents of frontier 
communities, however, both because of their physical surroundings in “nature” and 
because of their distance from civil authority, viewed themselves as actually living in a 
real “state of nature.”97  Residents in the Green Mountains offer an excellent case study 
of a settlement zone that operated quite close to the state of nature theorists envisioned. 
After the French and Indian War, the future Vermont territory was 
commandeered by Britain and annexed to the province of New York. Governor Benning 
Wentworth of New Hampshire saw the possibility of the annexation working in his favor, 
however, and began granting acres of land by the thousands.98 Migrants—predominantly 
from New England colonies—flooded the region. The population grew at a faster rate 
than any courts, churches, or practical civil authority could be established. Migrants 
quickly became aware the land was full of promise only if there were a power to protect 
it from the remaining native population, thieves, and individuals who looked to take 
advantage of the lack of state authority. Establishing a single entity as sovereign in this 
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region from 1763 to the eve of the American Revolution was complex because, legally 
speaking, all colonial governments and subjects existed under the sovereign authority of 
King George III. Colonists moved with this in mind, expecting the king and his provincial 
governments to provide the necessary characteristics of British civil society to ensure a 
stable community. As the population grew during the 1760s, the inability of the British 
state to erect a commanding presence in the region left residents to fend for themselves 
at every turn.  The consequence of this event led inhabitants to ponder who truly 
possessed ultimate authority in the region: was it the state, or the people?  
The Creation of a “State of Nature” 
As early as June 6, 1750, Governor George Clinton of New York wrote to 
Governor Wentworth that he expected him to retract the grants he had conferred in this 
territory in 1749, unless Wentworth desired Clinton “to Send a Representation of the 
Matter…before his Majesty.”99 It has been argued that Wentworth’s actual legal claim--
that New Hampshire’s boundary extended as far West as Massachusetts Bay’s and 
Connecticut’s--was secondary to his more practical judgment that if he were able to 
provide the region with actual settlers, the Board of Trade would conclude the matter in 
his favor.100 But his original motivation mattered little since colonists were mostly 
uninterested in a region with such a negative reputation.  
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A contemporary map clearly labels the land directly east and west of Lake 
Champlain and Lac du Saint-Sacrement (Lake George) as an area contested by French 
and Natives. Although this particular map does not label Abenaki territory, the Green 
Mountains were occupied primarily by that group. The Abenakis, a branch of the 
Fig. 1 From “Map of Canada and Louisiana which form New France and English colonies or are 
represent the countries contend…” published by Chez Daumont, 1756, Library of Congress, 
Maps Division, https://www.loc.gov/resource 
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Algonquin people, were organized as a rather dispersed republic composed of scattered 
kin and hunting groups throughout the Champlain and Connecticut River Valleys. They 
solidified their stronghold on the region due to their knowledge of the land and a 
persistent presence that no European had yet matched. Colin Callaway has determined 
that the village at Missisquoi (present day northwestern Vermont) was “the best-known 
and most enduring settlement.”101 A European visitor would be quickly reminded of the 
native presence, which could be seen “passing and repassing [the] frontiers into heart of 
country.”102 Before the French and Indian War, English settlers viewed the Green 
Mountains as “both a forbidding wilderness and an Indian stronghold.”103 To those 
residing in the more densely populated communities of British America, the region 
symbolized a purgatory between British civilization and the French enemy in Montreal, 
populated by “hostile” Natives.  
Although the French were a greater threat to the British empire as a whole, the 
native presence was perhaps the feature of the conflict that potential settlers feared most. 
Like most native communities of eastern America, the Abenakis were forced to adapt to 
fluctuating numbers caused by the northward migration of southern tribes, disease, and 
European expansion. For strategic reasons, they alternated between concentrating in 
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large central settlements and dispersing into widely scattered groups.104 This produced 
two outcomes. First, it preserved the natural environment far better than the British-
American mode of constant dense settlement.105 They maintained a nearly pristine 
ecosystem (aside from disturbances caused by the fur trade) with minimal cultivation. 
And secondly, it meant that natives were experienced navigators in the region—able to 
retreat and attack with ease using the natural landscape to their advantage.  
Before the end of the imperial wars in 1763, colonists showed little interest in 
settling this native stronghold, for the entire area—the northern frontier of Massachusetts, 
the northeastern frontier of New York, and the western frontier of New Hampshire—
was, in perception and reality, a constant theater of war. In March 1747, for example, the 
Champlain Valley became the setting of a massive battle when Abenakis, Iroquois, and 
French, as well as representatives from other native allies such as the Ottawas, 
Nipissings, Winnebagoes, and Hurons, met in Montreal to discuss war against the 
Mohawk enemy who were located to the west of Lake Champlain. The French 
inhabitants abandoned their settlement at St. Frederic (Crown Point) for Montreal, while 
those who remained prepared for war. By April, English garrisons along the New 
Hampshire frontier experienced the impact of those decisions made a month prior in 
Montreal. Number Four (Charleston, New Hampshire), a British frontier garrison 
intended to intercept Green Mountain war parties, was attacked by French and Native 
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soldiers. Captain Phineas Stevens reported the horrors: “they seemed every Minute as 
though they were going to swallow us up, using all the threatening Language they could 
possibly invent, with shouting & firing as if the heavens & earth were coming 
together.”106 In the events that followed, a military unit marched towards Lake 
Champlain seeking retribution. They were then surrounded and ambushed, and only 
narrowly escaped to Fort Dummer during their retreat from the unsuccessful effort.  It is 
not surprising, then, that potential settlers viewed the Green Mountains as full of 
danger.107 
The ease with which enemy parties moved throughout the Green Mountains 
continued to strike fear into the minds of English settlers. A few years later , during the 
French and Indian War, it was noted that the French, along with their native allies, had 
established forts around the Green Mountains and Lake Champlain where “they may 
send out their Parties to kill and scalp the Inhabitants, and ruin the Frontier Counties.”  
According to this particular tract, however, the Franco-Native alliance was not strictly a 
northern concern. Britain’s enemies sought to take advantage of the “present disunited 
State of the British Colonies, and the extreme Difficulty of bringing so many different 
Governments and Assemblies to agree in any speedy and effectual measures for common 
Defense and Security.” So long as colonial efforts against a common threat remained 
divided, an enemy could “murder and scalp our Farmers, with their Wives and Children, 
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and take an easy Possession of such Parts of the British Territory.”108 The efforts to unite 
the colonies did not prevent the war from occurring, however, and the stories told by 
those who had actually been to the Green Mountains further deteriorated any motivation 
within others to migrate. 
During the early years of the war, the imagery associated with the Green 
Mountains was gruesome to say the least. One article reported a forty-day scouting 
mission conducted by “Lieut. Kennedy (of the Regulars) …with some of the Mohawks 
and Highlanders.” The story’s setting stretched from St. John’s River (Saint-Jean-sur-
Richelieu) down the Champlain coast, where they encountered sights of burnt taverns, 
enemy checkpoints, and human scalps.109 In another grisly story, a group of carpenters 
accompanied by fifteen soldiers departed Fort Edward, New York, in the summer of 
1757, and were ambushed. After a partially successful pursuit, the remaining enemies 
escaped into the wilderness never to be seen again.110 While tales from frontier scouts 
often used hyperbolic and brutal language, the feeling of insecurity that Englishmen felt 
in the woods surrounding Lake Champlain could not be over stated. Without contrasting 
stories of success, the perception of the region remained gloomy.  
As the British advanced north towards the end of the war, however, victory 
carried with it a new understanding of the Green Mountains for provincial governors and 
colonists alike. The British chose the Champlain region as the location for a successful 
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two-pronged attack in 1759: one on land “to proceed by Lake Champlain,” and the other 
by water from Nova Scotia, “are to go up the River St. Lawrence.”111 As it became 
evident that the British empire now possessed “all their [enemy’s] Navigation upon Lake 
Champlain,” the perception of the region changed.112 The royal proclamation of 1763 
granted the entire territory to the British crown.  French residents of the region either 
returned to Europe, immersed themselves in Native cultures, or awaited their new lives 
under the domain of Britain.113 The Abenaki were severely weakened both in numbers 
and morale without their French allies for assistance; those that remained now lived in 
“a changing world in which the immediate presence of British settlers governed their 
opinions and actions.”114  
 The future of the Green Mountains was altered forever as dangerous tales of the 
American wilderness were suddenly replaced by the promise of industry and civilization. 
Benning Wentworth was perhaps the most important figure to seize the opportunity 
afforded by the Green Mountain annexation. Although his understanding of the situation 
will be discussed later, his aggressive granting of cheap land to willing purchasers 
profoundly and rapidly affected the demographics of the Green Mountains during the 
early 1760s. Also, the people themselves experienced a sudden newfound faith in the 
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region. Cheap land free of French and Indian aggression was enticing, but an even greater 
attraction was that the land lay virtually untouched from their perspective. Some saw the 
obstacle of cultivating and clearing land in its natural state as an expensive hindrance, 
but others found the region’s untouched nature particularly inviting. 
 
“It is Plain the World Never Was, Nor Ever Will Be, Without Numbers of 
Men in That State” 
Settlements in the Green Mountains prior to 1763 were few and far between. 
Those who settled beyond frontier garrisons pursued a life of economic uncertainty, war, 
and little security beyond his or her own personal abilities. After the war, however, both 
Fig. 2 From “A general map of the middle British colonies, in America; viz Virginia, 
Màriland, Dèlaware, Pensilvania, New-Jersey, New-York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island: 
of Aquanishuonîgy, the country of the confederate Indian…” by Lewis Evans, 1755, 
Library of Congress, Maps Division, www.loc.gov/item 
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New York and New Hampshire adopted their own distinct approaches to populating the 
region. New York’s method was slow-paced and essentially feudalistic, relying on 
wealthy individuals to populate, cultivate, and guide the land towards prosperity.115 This 
system naturally obstructed any hope for a speedy settlement of the region, and the pace 
was slowed even further with six different New York governors holding the office 
between 1763 and 1775. New Hampshire, on the other hand, experienced only two: 
Benning Wentworth (1741-1767) and his nephew John Wentworth (1766-1775). Under 
their direction, New Hampshire practiced a polar opposite strategy: they granted smaller 
tracts of land for a cheap price, and assumed that individuals would purchase the amount 
of land they were able to cultivate and improve.116 Under these circumstances, migrants 
with what would be known as “Hampshire Grants” had settled the region in the hundreds 
by March, 1764, when New York received word from the crown that the region was 
within their jurisdiction.117  New York’s inability to establish an effective civil presence, 
at a time of such rapid settlement, undermined its own authority in the region.  
                                                
115 Williamson notes that New York did not attempt to set up the same manorial system that it 
practiced in the Hudson Valley.  In the Grants region, New York “turned over the proprietorship 
of the towns to its own speculators rather than to Yankee speculators or settlers.” Vermont in 
Quandary, 9. 
116 Lord Dunmore wrote to Lord Hillsborough on March 9, 1771, that New Hampshire granted 
land for nine pence per 100 acres, while New York’s quit-rent system cost a half-crown per 100 
acres. O’Callaghan, E. B. ed., The Documentary History of the State of New-York, Vol. 4, 
(Albany: Charles Van Benthuysen, 1851), 674. 
117 The “Grant Controversy” dates back to the late 1740s, but not until the King-in-Council 
proclaimed on July 20, 1764 that “accordingly hereby Order and Declare the Western Banks of 
the River Connecticut…to be the Boundary Line between the said two Provinces of New 
Hampshire and New York,” was it legally over. In a State of Nature, 43-53. 
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In 1763, the New York government received interesting news from Alexander 
McLeans, a merchant of that colony. On his trip back from Canada he made a short stay 
at Crown Point: 
and there saw a considerable number of persons about five or six among which 
were two Gentlemen said to be principal men in New Hampshire Government, 
and representatives in that General Assembly and Justices of the Peace that the 
rest of the Persons with them were also (as was said) of that Colony, that these 
Persons declared that they came thither to Lay out Lands, and a man that appeared 
to be a principal person among them Declared that Crown Point was in their 
Government.118 
 
In response, later that year New York governor Cadwallader Colden issued a 
“Proclamation Declaring the Connecticut River the East Bounds of the Province of New 
York.”119 The proclamation notified all “Judges, Justices, and other Civil Officers” in the 
County of Albany—which encompassed the entire region up to the 45th parallel—to 
continue their work under the authority of New York.  
New York was forced to deal with these migrants who settled within their 
jurisdiction under grants signed by a New Hampshire governor. Governor Colden asked 
Sheriff Hermanus Schuyler to provide him with “the Names of all and every Person and 
Persons, who under the Grants of the Government of New-Hampshire, do or shall hold 
the Possession of any Lands Westward of Connecticut River.”120 While Schuyler worked 
                                                
118 Documentary History of New York, 558.  
119 Ibid. 
120 Documentary History of New York, 560. Douglas Greenberg discusses the difficulty in 
properly performing the job of Albany Sheriff in “The Effectiveness of Law Enforcement in 
Eighteenth-Century New York,” in Journal of Legal History, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July 1975), pp. 173-
207; 177. 
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to achieve his orders, Governor Colden wrote to the British Board of Trade in April 1764 
that Wentworth had granted “160 Townships, of six miles square each” west of the 
Connecticut River. Furthermore, he reported stories of “[men] in appearance no better 
than a Pedlar” throughout New York and New Jersey, “hawking and selling his pretended 
Rights of 30 Townships” in the region.121 Colden concluded by urging the Board of Trade 
to consider an expedient response to the “perhaps [mischievous]” state of society in the 
Grants region, “which may happen by the different claims of Jurisdiction.”122 In the 
meantime, New York chose to fight fire with fire. 
Philip Skene was a typical New York land owner in that he received large tracts 
of land which he was expected to successfully settle and cultivate. By 1765, Philip Skene 
had acquired a little over 20,000 acres east of Lake George, and had just returned from 
Europe convincing “60 other persons” to settle there, engaging “100 families more to 
come from.”123 New York’s effort is epitomized by a 1765 newspaper advertisement 
submitted by Skene himself in promotion of Skenesborough. The advertisement stated 
that potential settlers could acquire goods from the town of St. John’s, where “Fish and 
Venison…[are] to be had in Plenty.” As well, “all Kinds of Provisions…will be sold 
reasonably by the present Inhabitants to new Settlers.”124  
                                                
121 Documentary History of New York, 567. 
122 Documentary History of New York, 574. 
123 Doris Morton, Philip Skene of Skenesborough (Granville: Ms.Cellaneous Enterprises, 1995; 
originally published, Granville: Grastorf Press, 1959), 33. Philip Skene epitomized New York’s 
manorial land-granting system. As discussed above, however, the system was not directly 
implemented in the Grants. It seems appropriate to assume that New York proprietors were 
handed the role of Skene in their respective towns, with much of the populating and clearing 
already done by existing settlers. 
124 The Pennsylvania Gazette, 4/4/1765, 3. 
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While New York relied on men like Philip Skene and his advertisements to attract 
migrants, New Hampshire’s strategy to populate the region was in full swing. Already 
having obtained an ample number of settlers under New Hampshire titles, Governor 
Wentworth reassured his grantees in March 1764 that they could ignore the increasingly 
aggressive claims that Hampshire residents would lose their land to New York. He stated 
that Governor Colden was mistaken in his judgment and that New Hampshire “may 
legally extend her western Boundary as far as the Massachusetts claim reaches.” Current 
inhabitants “may not be intimidated, or any way hindered or obstructed in the 
Improvement of the Land so granted”; they were “to be industrious in clearing and 
cultivating their Lands agreeable to their respective grants,” ignoring New York’s 
“pretended right of Jurisdiction.”125  
In July 1764, after a royal order confirmed that the disputed territory belonged to 
New York, establishing civil society in the region became solely New York’s 
responsibility.126 It was a colonial government’s duty to ensure a community’s prosperity 
and civil stability. The key players in the controversy were certainly familiar with the 
work of Hobbes and Locke, and with the current concepts of what governments owed 
their people. As described in the previous chapter, civil society was believed to eradicate 
the fear of mistrust, ensure that unjust actions were met with just responses, and that 
                                                
125 Documentary History of New York, 570-2. In a State of Nature, 53. 
126 After the proclamation of 1764, Governor Colden began issuing land patents by the thousands. 
Many acres were understood as land “formerly granted under the Province of New Hampshire.” 
See Robert Shalhope, Bennington and the Green Mountain Boys: The Emergence of Liberal 
Democracy in Vermont, 1760-1850, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 62-
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one’s property was secured.  Locke and Hobbes argued that the role of the state was to 
enforce this stability within communities. If no state was able to provide an efficiently 
stable civil society, there remained a void left to be filled.  Colden was a graduate of 
Edinburgh University and Wentworth a graduate of Harvard, but for the average migrant, 
these concepts may not have been so clear.  Many simply thought of their role in society 
as being far removed from political decisions pertaining to the colony as a whole. There 
were others, however, often individuals who had invested much of their wealth in 
obtaining land grants, who were particularly determined to involve themselves in the 
development of civil society.  
The Calm Before the Storm 
In August 1764, Massachusetts residents John Horsfoot and Isaac Charles 
requested justice of the peace Samuel Robinson to defend the New Hampshire land titles 
by evicting three settlers who had settled on land in Pownal under New York grants. 127 
Robinson’s decision to do so was perhaps as much influenced by his personal interest in 
New Hampshire grants as by his obedience to his duties as justice of the peace. The 
Robinsons—Samuel and his sons Leonard, Samuel Jr., and Moses—were all heavily 
involved with land speculation in the region, owning thousands of acres of land under 
New Hampshire titles in Bennington, Shaftsbury, Rupert, Somerset, Castleton, and 
                                                
127 Robert A. Mello, Moses Robinson and the Founding of Vermont  (Barre: Vermont Historical 
Society, 2014), 26-27.  
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Pownal.128 To accept New York’s claim on his neighbor’s property would undermine the 
legitimacy of the right to his own land.  
After Robinson did his duty of clearing Hans Jurry Creiger, Peter Voss, and 
Bastiane Deale from the contested land, Sheriff Schuyler in turn obeyed his governor’s 
orders to “preserve the Peace” within New York’s jurisdiction by pursuing the “New 
Hampshire people” who harassed the Dutch settlers. Schuyler seized Robinson, Samuel 
Ashley, Horsfoot, and Charles (“the two last, pretended owners” of the land in Pownal) 
and brought them to the jail in Albany.129 This event demonstrates that inhabitants 
believed that securing one’s land and administering justice directly correlated with an 
established civil society. As of 1764, it was legally New York’s responsibility to perform 
these tasks, but their inability to legalize all grants held by actual settlers prolonged the 
conflict. It was the settlers themselves who first determined that the territory was simply 
too vast and the settlers too dispersed for Albany alone to govern properly.  
Many inhabitants in 1765 believed if counties could be established by New York, 
civil order would follow. Three petitions to the New York government led by a future   
advocate of the Vermont cause, Thomas Chandler, called for the creation of legitimate 
counties as “necessary for the better administration of Justice.”130 The first two petitions, 
of October 9 and 15, outlined a plan for creating five separate counties in the Green 
Mountains. The third petition, however, was less concerned with the logistics of 
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129 Documentary History of New York, 575-6. 
130 Documentary History of New York, 578-583. 
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establishing counties and instead highlighted the unfortunate state of the inhabitants’ (un-
governed) communities. Building on the two previous petitions, new counties would 
make sure that “offenders be Brought to Justice, and Creditors may Recover their Just 
Dues.” With language similar to that formerly employed to describe the undesirable state 
of nature, the petitioners lamented that their current situation made it possible for “every 
one to do what is Right in their own Eyes.” Protection was their foremost concern: 
protection of their property, but even more vital, the protection of their lives. These 
particular petitioners had lived “Now near Six months…without Law,” and had “made 
application to be protected, but as yet [were] not answered.” The conclusion of this 
petition took a dark turn when it stated that at least one murder and one kidnapping had 
occurred, and if nothing was done soon, “the Land will be filled with Nothing, but Villins 
and Murders.”131 The inhabitants, many of whom were willing to work with New York 
out of respect for the crown’s judgment, considered direct involvement from New York 
as the only way their community could succeed.  
Henry Moore, Colden’s replacement as governor, responded with a more 
proactive approach to the controversy upon his arrival to New York in 1765. A royal 
committee met and responded to the three petitions that although the entire region up to 
the forty-fifth parallel was not settled enough to establish counties, “a competent Number 
of fit persons for the Conservation of the Peace and administration of Justice” ought to 
be appointed.132 Hoping for a better relationship with the residents (as well as making 
                                                
131 Documentary History of New York, 582.  
132 Documentary History of New York, 584. 
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sure New York’s frontier could be properly protected), the new governor then asked for 
a complete list of able-bodied men, to which Samuel Robinson and Thomas Chandler 
responded in late 1765 and early 1766 respectively.133 In an attempt to cool the growing 
tensions and hinder any further confusion, New York created Cumberland County, 
ending nearly a half-decade of “lawlessness” in the southeastern portion of the Green 
Mountains. New York also granted a court of common pleas and a court of general 
sessions of the peace, and for the first time received from the inhabitants their 
“Nomination[s] of the Civil Authority for the County of Cumberland.”134 Recalling these 
events, Governor Moore wrote in 1767 that by establishing the county of Cumberland he 
hoped to begin consistently settling the region, and that once the other areas had attained 
“a sufficient number of Inhabitants,” they would also receive county status.135  
Moore’s objective was to legitimize the land claims of actual settlers under New 
Hampshire grants while simultaneously calming the New York proprietors angry that 
their lands were inhabited by people with “pretended” titles. At the time of Moore’s 
arrival in New York, the entire colony was in dismay due to the passage of the highly 
controversial Stamp Act. No land grants were processed at this time; for Moore “was 
determined not to issue any papers except such as were stamped and the people here 
refused to take them on that condition.” 136  At the same time, Moore complained that 
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because the Wentworth grants were so inexpensive, entire townships “have bought and 
sold, conveyed and reconveyed” to the extent that the original owners were 
unidentifiable. In this situation, Governor Moore found two actions necessary. First, to 
provide an opportunity for actual settlers—some of whom had “expended the whole and 
others the greatest part of what they were with in purchasing the said Grants”—to receive 
new patents from New York; and second, to appropriate land “on which no 
Improvements had been made” to New York, and grant that land to military officers as 
prescribed in the Proclamation of 1763.137 But Moore made these decisions unaware that 
some of the most aggressive Yankee speculators had just arrived in the Green Mountains 
with patents to land they planned on keeping without paying another pence. 
Authority and its Relationship to the Concept of Sovereignty in the Grants 
Region 
If the events of the early- and mid-1760s were a pot of water being filled and put 
on low heat, in the late 1760s the heat was turned up. As surveyor contracts were being 
signed by the dozens in New York, New England settlers who purchased New Hampshire 
titles were simultaneously moving their families to the exact same lands. The result of 
these contemporaneous events was the infamous “ejectment trials” of the 1770s. In 
January 1770, Colden, who had returned as governor, explained to colonial Secretary of 
State Lord Hillsborough how the grant controversy reached this boiling point. During 
                                                
had been so recently purchased under New Hampshire’s seal that no actual settlement had 
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137 Documentary History of New York, 602-3. 
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Colden’s term earlier in the decade, he wrote, he had “resolved on measures respected 
these Lands which I was then assured would give entire satisfaction to [the settlers].” 138 
Understanding that New York’s quit-rent prices were perhaps out of reach for the average 
settler who had already bought Hampshire grants, Colden provided settlers with New 
York “Grants and [left] it to themselves to pay me such proportion of my fees as they 
could conveniently do…this was so agreeable [they] immediately proceeded to take the 
necessary steps, for obtaining the new Grants.” Colden blamed his replacement, 
Governor Moore, for the controversy’s continued existence because Moore “refused to 
pass any [grants] without his full Fees [being] paid. This gave great disgust to the people, 
and occasioned those applications which have since been made to the King on this 
subject.” The situation was still not resolved by the end of the 1760s, and the grants 
population had increased by the thousands by the time Colden was reassigned to the 
governorship in 1769.  
By the early 1770s, hardy settlers were determined to both create a prosperous 
community and receive lands in the Green Mountains. The same wilderness that had 
struck fear in potential settlers only a decade before was now seen as full of potential. 
Economic opportunity was plentiful; recently annexed Quebec, full of French-Canadians 
and Natives, was, from an English point of view, an untapped trade market awaiting His 
Majesty’s subjects. North-flowing Lake Champlain provided easy access to the St. 
Lawrence waterway for those west of the mountains, and eastern residents had access to 
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the southern-flowing Connecticut River that led directly to Boston. Many envisioned the 
Champlain Valley’s destiny as a flourishing port providing lumber, assorted ashes, and 
furs to either the north or south, in return receiving finished luxuries from major cities. 
Protecting this territory became a life-or-death matter as the Grant controversy boiled 
over. 
New York’s effort to establish a more fixed presence in the region coincided with 
the New Hampshire authorities stepping away. Although the jurisdictional dispute 
between New Hampshire and New York had been settled in 1764, settlers and speculators 
continued to purchase New Hampshire titles for mere “pennies an acre” throughout the 
the remaining years of the 1760s.139 By the 1770s, the legal confusion caused by the 
grants led to violent conflict as New York authorities were confronted by radicalized 
settlers who were willing to use physical force to defend their property.  
One example of how this confusion intensified the conflict was when in January 
1770, New Hampshire governor John Wentworth wrote to New York governor Colden 
that as “Survey General of His Majesty’s Woods,” he reserved the right to administer 
grants distributed before 1764, when New York officially received the territory. 
Wentworth was specifically concerned in this letter with three family members--William 
Deane, William Deane Jr., and Willard Deane—who had all received New Hampshire 
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titles before 1764. All three had now been forcibly removed from their property by New 
York authorities, in a move that Wentworth called unjust harassment and persecution. 
This event demonstrates how royal governors were confronted by newly radicalized 
Grants settlers who were willing to use violence to defend their property. 
The story began in August 1769, when Benjamin Whiting received from both 
Richard Maurice, the New York judge of the Court of Vice Admiralty, and Thomas 
Ludlow, the Provost Marshall of New York, the “full power to execute” several writs 
against the Deanes for “destroying White Pine Timber within the County of 
Cumberland.” After detaining both William Deane Jr. and Willard Deane, Whiting was 
confronted on multiple occasions by interested neighbors who “desired to know which 
way [whiting] determined to Travell with the said Deanes to New York.” While Whiting 
and his prisoners rested for the night in Marlborough (Vermont region), he encountered 
“Riotous men from Brattleboro and Guilford who behaved in a Very hostile manner and 
swore they would have the prisoners or pull down the house, they Tarried all night and 
Dispersed the Next day.”140 Increasingly, residents of the Grants were unwilling to allow 
any intrusion on the preservation of their property. Similar social networks such as the 
one involved in intimidating Whiting mobilized groups of residents to protect each other 
from the increasing numbers of Yorkers and Yorker-surveyors arriving in the early 
1770s. 
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By 1770, many Grants settlers had spent an extended period of time without a 
formal hierarchical government structure (some at least a decade), and in response, they 
formed localized political units based on popular support, persuasion, and force, intended 
to defend their constituents’ livelihoods and property. An event that occurred in May 
1770, one of the precipitating events for the infamous ejectment trials, displays how far 
Grants settlers were willing to go. Daniel Whipple, High Sheriff of Cumberland, had 
assembled a posse to re-capture “Joseph Wait and others who had escaped out of his 
Custody” by neighbors who had come to their defense.141 Whipple’s posse of 
approximately fifteen men was met by roughly forty “approaching in a Riotous 
manner…who were armed with Guns, Swords, Pistols, and Clubs.” Whipple “made 
Proclamation aloud in form of Law for them to Disperse,” but to no avail. John Grout, a 
local resident and member of the New-York posse testified that he was  “was put in fear 
and Dread of his Life.”  Residents who violently opposed New York authority equated 
their land with their life; opposing a threat to one’s own livelihood, as both Locke and 
Hobbes noted, was absolutely natural. It had been more than five years since New York 
had been granted the territory, and many were skeptical about whether New York had 
the concerns of actual settlers foremost. The decisions made by these residents was not 
to refute New York authority, but to replace it; authority in the region was no longer 
reserved for government officials, but belonged to the people themselves. 
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Affidavits from the ensuing ejectment trials in Albany display how a group such 
as the Green Mountain Boys was able to unify and flourish. The Green Mountain Boys 
required a solid constituency that sought their protection, and finding such a group was 
not difficult. Ebenezer Cole explained in his affidavit that since his arrival in 1764, there 
had been at least a five-fold increase of settlers.142 Most of these new settlers had 
purchased lands from original New Hampshire grantees, and their land was safe, since 
the governor of New York had been ordered not to molest any current inhabitants, nor 
grant any more land in the region.143 Although most migrations had occurred after the 
land was officially declared New York’s, settlers still possessed legal grants signed by a 
royal governor. Some of these purchasers initially acquired new legitimate titles from 
New York proprietors, but for whatever reason—perhaps the high price of New York 
titles or the prevention of the New York governor from signing— “they in general 
changed their minds, and declared the New York Proprietors dared not to serve them.”  
Once that decision had been made, “and from the common and public conversation…it 
was manifest...they had confederated to support each other by Force of Arms.”144 
Observed by Ethan Allen, leader of the Green Mountain Boys, resistance to New York 
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authorities was absolutely necessary for the defense of all settlers on land held under 
New Hampshire titles.145 The Green Mountain Boys had found their constituency. 
The Green Mountain Boys also needed to work within a system their neighbors 
would consider legitimate, however. According to Shaftsbury Justice of the Peace John 
Munro, the Green Mountain Boys “regulated themselves by the Laws of New Hampshire, 
and the Charters.”146 Simon Stevens added “that by the Law of New Hampshire every 
Township chooses annually select men, and a variety of other public officers, and are 
authorized to hold Town meets.”147 Thus the Green Mountain Boys organized into 
traditional New England governmental structures, but by the authority of the people, and 
not of the state. With the colony of New Hampshire having released its hold on this 
territory, the Green Mountain Boys became the unofficial “select men” of Grant title 
holders by the early 1770s. As a functioning military and governmental entity, the Green 
Mountain Boys sought to replace New York authority.  They justified their action with 
the will of the people they served, along with their right to the land they purchased. 
A conversation reported by Judge Samuel Wells of Brattleboro suggests the 
extent to which the Green Mountain Boys were operating to replace New York’s 
authority. Wells called upon Nathan Stone, a leader of the Green Mountain Boys, to 
accompany him on a trip into town during May 1770. They discussed the increasing 
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presence of New York law agents attempting to seize Grant residents, and how the 
residents “opposed and threatened” the agents in response. Stone, presumably speaking 
on behalf of the Boys, declared that “the making [of Cumberland] County was a sham 
and not a Reality…that it was never intended that these Courts should Act in Trying 
Causes, that there was no Justice to be obtained in the County.”148 Wells countered by 
attempting “to Convince the said Stone of the danger of opposing the Execution of the 
Laws”—that outspoken and violent opposition to the government damaged the prospect 
of a amicable relationship between the people and state, which hindered the potential 
more efficient (formal) avenues had for voicing duress. Perhaps the most threatening 
comment from Stone came towards the end of their conversation, when Stone stated that 
his opinion was not a recent resolution, but “had been fixed at least five or six months 
before, and that while he had life he would oppose the Sheriff, and that the people of 
[Windsor] and some other places would joine…to the last drop of their blood.” Not 
everyone agreed with Stone, of course; as the continued flow of petitions to the 
government of New York demonstrates, residents remained divided about New York’s 
authority in the early 1770s. New York authority still warranted respect as an appendage 
of Britain’s empire, but the power of both provincial governments, and the crown, was 
waning. 
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“That a Commonwealth, Without Sovereign Power, is But a Word, 
Without Substance” 
The King’s sovereignty stood on two pillars in the grants region prior to the 
American Revolution. First was the New York provincial government. By 1772 the entire 
region was composed of New York counties (Gloucester was created in 1770 and 
Charlotte in 1772). The second power executing the King’s sovereignty was the Green 
Mountain Boys. Constant encouragement for the Green Mountain Boys came from those 
in favor of defending the Hampshire titles; one inhabitant, Simon Stevens, believed “that 
had it not been for those Encouragements all opposition to the Government of New York 
would long since have been at an End.”149 In the beginning, the Green Mountain Boys 
offered only an immediate defense against New York agents, but the group evolved in 
the early 1770s from a pseudo-military to a pseudo-governmental organization virtually 
replacing any provincial charter of governance. By the time of the American Revolution, 
it had become a generally accepted truth among Grants colonists that a sovereign’s 
fundamental existence stemmed only from its ability to bring the people out of nature. It 
was the people who decided whether or not a state was properly functioning, and subjects 
were now the final arbiter of governmental truth. Legitimacy was completely reliant on 
the consent of subjects. 
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By the early 1770s, it had become evident that a significant portion of residents 
in the Green Mountains were not willing to give in to New York’s authority. Networks 
of agitators were able to organize rapid responses of support from neighbors and nearby 
residents who had similar politics.  When John Munro wrote to James Duane in early 
November 1772, he complained that members of the Green Mountain Boys “are settling 
the land all over in full confidence that they will hold it forever…do you think our king 
Fig. 3 From “A Map of the Province of New-York reduc’d from the larger 
drawing of that Province, compiled from actual surveys by order of His 
Excellency William Tyron, Esq., Captain General & Governor of the 
same…” by Sauthier, Clause Joseph, 1776, Library of Congress, Maps 
Division, https://www.loc.gov/resource 
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will pardon the…murderers?”150 Only a few weeks later Munro complained to New York 
Governor William Tyron, “what can a Justice do when the whole Country combines 
against him?” Munro had recently captured counterfeiters John Searles of Arlington and 
Comfort Carpenter of Shaftsbury, but as he reported, they escaped with ease. 
Furthermore, local inhabitants had “destroyed one of my Pot ash works,” and he 
concluded that even if he were to send constables out to apprehend individuals, “the 
constables will not be faithful for they are its my opinion less or more concerned [with 
the counterfeiting].”151  
Munro was not alone, however; there were still many settlers who desired a more 
proactive and accommodating approach from New York.  A solution for settlers who 
remained faithful to the king’s orders of 1764 was to strengthen the relationship between 
their region and the government of New York. Back in 1767, Governor Moore had 
explained to Lord Shelburne that “[Cumberland County] was neither populous enough 
to require such a Priviledge [of assembly members], and the expence of paying their 
Members which is constantly practised in this part of the world would have been 
burthensome to them so that they themselves for these reasons alone declined it.” But 
Cumberland County’s circumstances changed by December 1772, when 151 residents 
signed a petition to send representatives to the General Assembly—to “[establish] that 
firm and lasting connection which [the petitioners] are desirous should ever subsist 
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between them and the Government to which it is their happiness to belong and will enable 
the more readily to accomplish the good purposes of Government.”152 In February 1773, 
roughly 300 residents of Skenesborough, now within the limits of the newly established 
Charlotte County, petitioned as well for a more solid connection with New York 
government.153  
Although by 1773, all residents in the Green Mountains legally lived within the 
borders of one New York county or another, many possessed (and continued to purchase) 
land grants signed under the New Hampshire seal. Inhabitants still waiting to legitimize 
their land titles from Gloucester and Cumberland Counties provided the government of 
New York with a clear description of their anxieties in February 1773:  
That the inhabitants of [Gloucester and Cumberland] whose Titles remain 
unconfirmed suffer the greatest Inconveniencies on that Account. That they 
cannot carry on their Improvements with spirit and vigour from the uncertainty 
whether they may not be finally deprived of them and loose their Labour. That 
they are not entitled to the Rights and Privileges of Freeholders from the Defects 
of their present Charters, nor can they for the same Reason support any Action 
for their Landed Property when it is injured or withheld from them, That while 
these distressing Circumstances fall heavy on Individuals they at the same Time 
obstruct the Growth and further Cultivation of these New Counties impede the 
equal Administration of Justice. 
 
The petition expressed both psychological and systematic setbacks to their situation. 
Psychologically, they could not continue working in fear that all that they had worked 
for could be taken away from them at any moment--either by a New York proprietor or 
by a particularly aggressive neighbor. The inefficient court and justice system in their 
                                                
152 Documentary History of New York, 815. 
153 Documentary History of New York, 818. 
 71 
respective counties made seeking justice impossible.  While the Gloucester County Court 
was established by New York in March 1770, for example, Judge Taplin heard only eight 
cases in its first year of existence. In February, 1771, the officers were unable to conduct 
court in Kingsland due to “there Being No Road and Snow very Deep.” They “concluded 
we ware farr in the woods we Did not Expect to See any House” so court was 
adjourned.154 Without efficient execution of the judicial process, many would 
increasingly turn to the alternative method of violent, yet to many justifiable, opposition. 
Authority in the Green Mountains was hotly contested. Many waited anxiously 
for the validation of their grants by New York, an event that often never came. Others 
took matters into their own hands. Individuals and families continued to purchase, settle, 
and cultivate land northward up to the 45th Parallel, a territory virtually untouched by 
Europeans before the 1770s.  The Grants region still faced many obstacles in the way of 
establishing a civil society, however, as the animosity between Great Britain and her 
colonies increased in the mid 1770s. While some looked towards New York—and thus 
the crown—as the source of legitimate sovereignty, others pursued the path of colonial 
rebellion, arguing against the legitimacy of New York and ultimately also of Great 
Britain’s government. (Some in the Grants argued against the legitimacy of New York 
and for the legitimacy of Great Britain, but that is another story.) 
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CHAPTER 3: “JUSTICE BETWEEN SOVEREIGNS” 
As I showed in the first chapter, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke both 
demonstrated that the experiences of Man in nature would have a significant impact on 
the erection of a state. Hobbes and Locked also argued that people must sacrifice their 
will to the state in order for a state to function efficiently; without that sacrifice, the state’s 
laws would be mere suggestions. Inhabitants do not immediately transition from a state 
of nature to civil society once a state has been created. They relinquish their free will to 
the state as it proves efficient in bringing them out of nature thus increasing the state’s 
authority. This chapter will examine the transition of the Hampshire Grants from a state 
of nature into a civil society.  
Two simultaneous processes occurred in Vermont between 1777 and 1791 that 
relate directly to the concept of sovereignty. The first was the process of the Vermont 
state forming and stabilizing in the midst of the American Revolution. During the 
struggles in the early 1770s, the Green Mountain Boys often presented themselves as 
defending the cause of the “common people” against “gentlemen, with all their 
pretensions.”155 When the time came for the leaders of the Hampshire Grants to design a 
state, an event many former leaders of the Boys participated in, it was essential that the 
people’s ultimate authority be systematically represented in the new constitution. Once 
the document was framed, the leaders became spokesmen for Vermont as they justified 
its existence to both Continental and British representatives. These Vermonters held firm 
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to the position that their new state was independent and autonomous on all accounts. As 
leaders worked to perfect their art of governance, the Grants residents were forced to 
make a decision: do they join Vermont? 
The second process this chapter will discuss is the formation of a self-conscious 
group of people who considered themselves Vermonters. Although the birth of Vermont 
may be said to have occurred when the constitution was drafted in 1777, not all people 
inhabiting the Hampshire Grants were “Vermonters” at that time. Many people living on 
the east side of the Green Mountains--in what they considered to be Cumberland County, 
New York--continued to petition New York’s representatives in the Continental 
Congress, even after Vermont’s first General Assembly met in 1778. By 1785, however, 
this uncertainty had ended: Vermont’s territorial claims had become one with its 
geographic boundaries. By 1787, when talk of the United States constitution was in full 
swing, the people of the Grants region now considered themselves Vermonters.  
The Birth of Vermont 
 The leaders of the movement to defend the Hampshire Grants from New York’s 
control were not erudite political theorists, they were opportunists--fairly creative and 
self-reflective, but still opportunists. By 1775 the Allen brothers had acquired nearly 
65,000 acres of land in the northwest territory of the Grants.156 Selling and buying land 
continued in the region as residents purchased land—much of it from the Allens and their 
Onion River Land Company—throughout the previously unsettled (by Europeans) areas 
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of the north. Before the Revolution, the Green Mountain Boys were merely the vanguard 
of a grassroots movement concerned with the protection and security of frontier settlers. 
That all changed once the war broke out in 1775.  
At that point, the magnitude of the Hampshire Grants controversy expanded 
exponentially. Only a few months after the Green Mountain Boys captured Fort 
Ticonderoga in May, 1775, their movement had become a concern for New York’s newly 
organized Committee of Correspondence. The Albany Committee of Safety reported in 
1775 that inhabitants of the Grants were hesitant to sign “the general Association” under 
the authority of New York as part of the Continental Congress.157  In September, the 
Committee of Safety acknowledged there were “Doubts and Uneasiness” amongst Grants 
residents who were “apprehensive that they may…be disquieted in their Possessions and 
Claims” should they join the Association. The Committee promised that if the Grants 
residents joined New York, they would not be subjected to “any Controversey respecting 
their Claim or Title.” Grants residents were thus provided with their first opportunity to 
have their lands legitimated by New York free of charge. Still, skeptics in the Grants 
region--especially those residing in New York’s Charlotte County on the west side of the 
mountains--did not trust the Committee’s promise.158 Although some residents of the 
Green Mountains wanted to join the New York patriots in their struggle against Great 
Britain, many saw the struggle against Great Britain and New York as one and the same. 
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In January of 1776, representatives from eighteen towns on the west side of the 
grants met in Dorset to discuss the bargain offered to them by New York’s Committee.159 
The January convention resolved to “represent the particular case of the inhabitants of 
the N. Hampshire Grants to the honorable Continental Congress by Remonstrance and 
petition.”160 In charge of drafting this petition were James Breckenridge, Heman Allen, 
Jonas Fay, William Marsh, and Thomas Rowley. All of these men were involved with 
the Green Mountain Boys movement, and James Breckenridge, the only man from this 
list not in the formal ranks of the Boys, had been evicted from his land by New York 
officials in 1770.161 The “Remonstrance” certainly represented a specific demographic, 
and was submitted to the Continental Congress by Heman Allen in May.  While the 
residents waited for Allen response, in June, 1776, a “warrant” was distributed to “the 
several Inhabitants of the N. Hampshire Grants” asking for representatives to come to 
Dorset in the following month “to receive the report of Capt. Heman Allen,” and consider 
the status of the Grants region in the Continental Congress.162 Allen had received an 
unfavorable response from the Continental Congress, and returned home with the news 
just before the July convention.163  
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The July convention to which Allen presented this report consisted of new 
representatives from west-side towns such as Cornwall, Jericho, and Monkton, but also 
included representatives from Townshend, the first town that was considered “east side;” 
all in all, forty-eight members representing thirty-two towns met to discuss the fate of 
the Hampshire Grants. 
It was this convention, in July of 1776, that initiated the process of transforming 
the resistance movement against New York into an American state. The first duty of the 
July convention was to read the petition submitted to the Continental Congress. The 
“Remonstrance” Allen presented did not waste much time on Britain’s “efforts to bring 
the inhabitants…of America, into base and servile subjection to Arbitrary Power.” 
Rather, it brought attention to the “peculiar situation” which the petitioners “have for a 
series of years been exercised, and are still struggling under.”164 As the petition stated:  
[We] are entirely willing to do all in our Power in the General Cause, under the 
Continental Congress[…]but are not willing to put ourselves under the honorable 
provincial Congress of New York in such manner as might in future be 
detrimental to our private property. 
 
The petitioners emphasized that they wished to “engage in the Glorious Cause, without 
fear of giving our opponents [New York] any advantage in the said Land dispute.” The 
petition concluded by stating that their “Continental service” would be “as inhabitants of 
said New Hampshire Grants, and not as inhabitants of the province of New York.”  
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The July convention marked an official separation of the Grants residents into a 
distinct community. The Remonstrance from May had only stated the Grants position in 
reference to New York, without systematically replacing its authority. In July, they 
initiated the systematic transition from New York to Grants control: the convention 
resolved unanimously that “any person or persons, inhabitants of the New Hampshire 
Grants” who chose to “subscribe and return an Association to any Committee or 
Committees of Safety for either of the Counties in the province of N. York. or to the 
provincial Congress thereof,” would be considered “enemies to the Common Cause of 
the N. Hampshire Grants.”165 Although the previous chapter demonstrates that Grants 
residents had a variety of responses to New York, the July convention was the first effort 
to establish a “Common Cause” for all residents in the distinct territory.  
In late 1776 and early 1777, delegates from the territory met to legitimate their 
separatist agenda. In a meeting in September 1776, fifty-six delegates represented thirty-
six towns “on the east and west side of the range of Green Mountains.”166 The minutes 
of the September convention open with a statement of the official cause for the meeting: 
although “for a series of years” the main topic of concern had been the “disingenuous 
conduct of the former Colony (now the State of) New York,” they were no longer 
interested in mending past grievances. At this convention, they agreed to form the 
Hampshire Grants “into a separate and distinct” state. At the same time, all members, 
“being legally delegated and authorized to transact the public and political affairs of the 
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aforesaid District of Lands,” also agreed they would only conduct business “that shall 
not be repugnant to the resolves of the honorable Continental Congress.” A meeting was 
called for October, at Westminster Court House, a convention that would (the 
representatives hoped) include ample representation from the New York-leaning east-
side towns. After a poor showing at that October convention (missing notables like 
Martin Chittenden and key representatives from Windsor and Woodstock), the group 
adjourned until January of 1777. The group met in Westminster in January, but this time 
included representatives of sixteen towns167 from both the east and west sides of the 
Green Mountains. On January 16, the convention voted “that the district of land 
commonly called and known by the name of New Hampshire Grants, be a new and 
separate state; and for the future conduct themselves as such.” The convention set up a 
committee composed of Nathan Clark, Ebenezer Hoisington, John Burnham, Jacob 
Burton, and Thomas Chittenden to draft a formal “declaration, for a new and separate 
state.”168 
The purpose of the declaration was to demonstrate “the right of the inhabitants” 
to establish a separate state. By establishing two natural rights, the Grants declaration 
made the case that it was against human nature for the residents to remain under New 
York. The stated rights were a negative description of what Hobbes and Locke believed 
were the purposes of government. First, the declaration asserted that “whenever 
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protection is withheld, no allegiance is due, or can of right be demanded.”169 As Hobbes 
wrote: “The obligation of subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no 
longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.”170 The second 
resolution in the declaration echoed Locke’s belief in the government’s essential duty to 
protect one’s property: 
That whenever the lives and properties of a part of a community have been 
manifestly aimed at by either the legislative or executive authority of such 
community, necessity requires a separation. 
 
Here, the authors imitated Locke’s language in Two Treatises: “Hence it is a mistake to 
think, that the supreme or legislative power of any common-wealth, can do what it will, 
and dispose of the estates of the subject[.]”171  As a third argument, the Vermont 
declaration asserted that their decision to erect a statewas a response to Congress’s May 
1776, recommendation that “the respective assemblies and conventions of the United 
Colonies, where no government, sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs has been, 
heretofore, established, to adopt such government as shall[…]best conduce to the 
happiness and safety of their constituents in particular, and of Americans in general.” In 
conclusion, Vermonters believed “that a just right exists in this people to adopt measures 
for their security,” which applied not only against the government of Great Britain, “but 
also against that of New York.” 
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 With this declaration, the Vermont state was created, but not yet the system of 
governance. At Windsor on June 4, 1777, seventy-two delegates representing twenty-
two west-side towns and twenty-six east-side towns met to discuss the government of the 
Grants—an overwhelming representation compared to the twenty-two men who had met 
in January.   At this convention, representatives named their state, which “shall hereafter 
be called and known by the name of Vermont.”172 Since the declaration of separation in 
January, the convention declared, “no government sufficient to the exigencies of our 
affairs has been hitherto established.” It was therefore the “opinion of the representatives 
of the people of [Vermont]” to “make and publish the recommendation for the express 
purpose of taking up government.” The following month, in July, the first constitution of 
Vermont was drafted at a convention assembled in Windsor. Thomas Chittenden was 
encouraging towns early the following year to submit their ratifications; the first Vermont 
General Assembly was to meet in March, 1778.173  
The Constitution of 1777 
It is my contention that Vermont ultimately survived the Revolution as an 
independent state because the 1777 Constitution provided both the people, and the state, 
an immense amount of power. This was done through a system of governance that 
allowed the positions of the executive branch— “A Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and 
twelve persons”— to maintain tremendous power over the day-to-day operations of 
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governance, while simultaneously providing the people with the ultimate authority to 
decide who held these positions.174 The people’s constitutional power to vote was their 
expression of ultimate authority, and as the historian J.R Pole noted,  by the Revolution 
it was believed “a constitution ought to bear some sort of direct authorization that would 
place it beyond the power of government to change.”175 The 1777 Constitution provided 
the executive with enough power to make important decisions immediately, and without 
check; but Vermont’s founders believed the true power was ultimately in the hands of 
the people, and provided them with frequent and free elections to those powerful 
positions. 
For Vermont framers, the most important part of the process of designing a 
people-oriented government was to identify the rights of the state’s inhabitants, and 
although the delineation of these natural rights was somewhat abstract, they were at least 
deeply rooted in the experience of the Grants controversy. (New York’s 1776 
constitution, in contrast, contained no Bill of Rights.) “Men were born equally free and 
independent,” the framers wrote. Drawing on the idea of Man’s unlimited free will, or 
unlimited right, in nature, there were “certain natural, [and] inherent[…]rights” that no 
state could act against.176 Vermonters thus agreed to have the original and comprehensive 
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right replaced with just a few “unalienable” ones. The constitution defined these rights 
as “the enjoying and defending of life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”177 They added the right to 
acquire, possess, and protect one’s property to the Declaration of Independence’s “life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness”—after all, it was the protection of property acquired 
and possessed that had caused Grants inhabitants to oppose New York authority in the 
first place. These were rights the 1777 Constitution provided all “inhabitants of the state 
of Vermont.”  
To some inhabitants, however, more rights were granted. The “freemen” of 
Vermont received systematic inclusion on behalf of the sovereign people in the process 
of governance. Any male at least 21 years old, who had lived in Vermont for a minimum 
of one year before elections, of “quiet and peaceable behavior,” was eligible to vote in 
Vermont’s annual elections.178 Before actually participating in the elections, however, 
those eligible were required to take an oath swearing their allegiance to the duty of 
voting—“as established by the constitution.”179 Voters consented to the system of 
governance by taking the oath, and then actively participated in their role. Hobbes 
discussed oaths in his chapter “On the Liberty of Subjects.” By consenting to the 
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sovereign state, “I authorize, or take upon me, all his actions.”180 Locke went a bit deeper 
in describing an individual’s ability to authorize the state’s power. It was first necessary 
to establish the “capacity” for an individual to know the laws of their land. The individual 
is no longer under his guardian’s protection, “the father and son are equally free…equally 
subjects of the same law together.”181 The requisites set for one to take the oath in 
Vermont (age of 21, etc.) established what the state deemed was the standard of a 
“freeman.” Once the freemen had voted, however, the elected representatives assumed 
every bit of the people’s sovereign power.  
The constitution gave the executive control over nearly all aspects of authority. 
After voting, the people theoretically retained their “undubitable, unalienable and 
indefeasible right, to reform, alter or abolish government,” but doing so now ran the risk 
of being labelled treason.182 Although, as Locke would have approved, the “supreme 
legislative power” was given to the legislature, the supreme executive power—including 
the right to correct the final draft of any future legislation—was reserved for the 
“Governor and Council.”183 Just to name a few additional powers, the executive had the 
rights to “supply every vacancy in any office” on the occasion of “death, resignation, 
removal or disqualification,” to “correspond with other States,” and to “lay embargoes.” 
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The executive’s responsibility, in other words, was one big elastic clause established so 
that paternalistic “spokesmen” could make decisions they viewed as necessary and 
proper on behalf of every Vermonter. All final decisions, including those that concerned 
legislation, were made by these fourteen individuals annually elected. 
Within its historical context, the voting power each “freeman” received was 
immense and unusually progressive. The Vermont definition of a freeman, 
contemporarily speaking, reserved a profound acknowledgement of the voter’s ability to 
reason. Compared to the Pennsylvania constitution, which comes closest to the 
democratic egalitarianism of Vermont’s, the voters of Vermont had considerably more 
power.185 In Vermont, voters received fourteen distinct opportunities each year to vote 
for positions that possessed an immense amount of decision-making power; 
Pennsylvanians only elected three or four representatives (depending on their district) 
every two or three years.186 The system was traditional in the sense that government 
officials often possessed a significant amount of landed interest in the future success of 
the state, but was progressive in that once a year those individuals willingly accepted an 
opportunity for the people to strip them of their power.187  
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“Justice Between Sovereigns”: The Haldimand Negotiations 
The Haldimand Negotiations provide a case study to illuminate the relationship 
between the executive and the people. Geo-political interests split the state during this 
period, which created what historian Peter Onuf has described as “a highly interested and 
calculated species of “loyalism.””188 By the early 1780s, west-side residents, a handful 
of whom had purchased lands under New Hampshire titles from the Allens, were 
increasingly involved with Canadian (and thus British) commerce. This group took the 
opportunity to acquire cheap land in the north, extending Vermont’s actual settlement 
boundaries to its proclaimed political ones at the 45th Parallel. The promise of 
establishing a foreign port on the lake in the north, similar to those in New York and 
Boston, could not be realized without friendly relations with Quebec, whose location in 
the St. Lawrence trade system extended from Lake Superior through the Great Lakes and 
into the St. Lawrence River, ultimately leading to Atlantic ports in Canada. Not all 
Vermonters benefitted from the proposed development of the north, however. While the 
center of the struggle for Vermont had always been located roughly in the vicinity of the 
Allens in the south- and mid-western part of the state, the Vermont state inherited 
territory on both sides of the Green Mountains after the union in 1777. Along the 
Connecticut River, economic interests were invested in the port of Boston.  
The Haldimand negotiations themselves were a series of communications 
between Frederick Haldimand, governor of the province of Quebec, and Vermont 
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executive members Martin Chittenden (Williston), Jonas Fay (Bennington), and Ira Allen 
(Colchester), with the assistance of their hired messenger, Ethan Allen. As members of 
the executive, the elected officials possessed the power to correspond with other states 
as representatives of the entire Vermont state.190 The language employed by Vermont’s 
leaders in general during the time period when the negotiations were underway 
frequently emphasized the independent status of the state. They reminded representatives 
of both Great Britain and the United States that they had no political ties to either. In the 
Continental Congress, Vermont’s right to exist was continually challenged by the still 
annoyed New York officials.191 Britain, on the other hand, was willing to offer Vermont 
the status of a sovereign colony in her American empire, should Vermont support British 
war efforts.192 Given this context, the Vermont executive successfully fulfilled its duty 
to Vermonters by protecting the existence of Vermont through negotiations with the 
British. Just as Descartes noted to Elizabeth in 1646 that there existed a distinct code of 
ethics reserved for states and their leaders, Vermont executives acted on a distinct 
“justice between Sovereigns” during the Haldimand negotiations.  
Although he was not a member of the Vermont executive, Ethan Allen was extra-
legally involved with the Haldimand negotiations as a messenger and assigned 
representative. In his correspondence with both the Continental and British states, he was 
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careful to uphold Vermont’s state sovereignty. He reminded Major Christopher Carleton, 
who had led a force of natives and British regulars “on a mission of destruction” in the 
Champlain Valley in 1778, that any deal between the Vermont executive and Frederick 
Haldimand “respects Vermont, exclusive of any Connections whatever with the United 
States, with whom this state are wholly unconnected, and who are, and for a long Time 
have been in a Spirited Controversy with the State of New York.”193 Allen’s ability to 
speak on behalf of the Vermont state was extra-legal, but his language represents the 
contemporary understanding of independence that radiated from Vermont.  
The negotiations intensified in the fall of 1780, when Ethan Allen was approached 
by Beverley Robinson, a representative of the British state who had been confused, but 
delighted, when the Vermont militia, led by General Allen, allowed a British convoy to 
march south from Canada without interference.194 Speaking on behalf of the British state, 
Beverley supposed Vermont was joining the British cause after all:  
I have never had an answer from you; but the frequent Accounts we have had for 
3 Months past from your part of the Country Confirms me in the Opinion I had 
of yr inclination to join the Kings Cause and to assist in Restoring America to her 
former peacible & happy Constitution. 
 
Ethan Allen received this letter from Robinson in February 1781. In the text above, 
Robinson refers to a letter he made sure was hand delivered in July 1780, to which there 
had been no response. The lack of response was because Allen had “immediately 
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brought” the letter to a “secret discussion” with the Vermont executive.195 The executive, 
in turn, kept the letter secret from both the Continental Congress and the people of 
Vermont for nearly eight months. 
 During those eight months, the Vermont executive deliberated about whether 
they might best protect Vermont’s independence by allying with Britain or with the 
colonies. In the letter from Robinson, who spoke for the British authorities, Allen was 
assured that if Vermont were to assist “in unit[ing] America again to Great Britain, & 
restoring that happy Constitution we have So wantonly & unadvisedly Destroyed,” the 
state would be recognized as an independent province. Referring to himself as an 
“American,” Robinson stressed the detrimental effects of the war on “peace & that mild 
& good government” guaranteed by British rule. Robinson intended their correspondence 
to remain strictly private, and asked Allen to “Send a friend of yr own here with proposals 
to the General [Haldimand].” There is no evidence that Allen ever responded to 
Robinson’s questions about Vermont’s allegiance, but when Allen submitted these letters 
to the Continental Congress almost a year later in March, 1781, he did remind Samuel 
Huntington, a representative from Connecticut, that Vermont had “an Indubitable Right 
to agree on terms of Cessation of Hostilities with Great Briton Provided the United States 
Persist in Rejecting her Application for a Union with them.”196 States, as an “artificiall 
Man,” according to Hobbes, possessed the freedom to act on their own will.197  
                                                
195 Beverly Robinson to Ethan Allen, 2/2/1781, in Ethan Allen and His Kin, vol. 1, 107-8. 
196 Ethan Allen to Samuel Huntington, 3/9/1781, in Ethan Allen and His Kin, vol. 1, 109-110. 
197 See note 58. 
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Throughout the negotiations members of the executive did not forget it was the 
people who possessed ultimate authority in the Vermont state. Ira Allen made this point 
clear to Frederick Haldimand in July, 1781, after their correspondence had “become the 
topick of Discourse Through the United States.” 198 He explained that although Vermont 
planned to send representatives to the Continental Congress, it seemed apparent that 
Congress intended “Nothing more than to Keep this State in Suspense to the End of the 
war and then Divide her territory amongst the Claiming States (which is Doubtless the 
intention of many).” Allen supposed that once “another denial from Congress” was made 
public, the “popular bodies” in Vermont  would turn against Congress, guaranteeing the 
re-election of the current pro-Canadian executive. This would “make a Revolution So 
long wished for by many.” 200 The “Revolution” Allen referred to was not political or 
military, but social. If the freemen of Vermont knew that Congress had rejected a request 
for statehood, Allen believed they would turn against the prospects of union with the new 
United States. The strategy pursued during the negotiations rested on the belief that 
neither New York nor the Continental Congress would go on the offensive against a 
territory Britain recognized as a legitimate ally. The policy, ideally, would permit 
                                                
198 Ira Allen to Frederick Haldimand 7/10/1781, in Ethan Allen and His Kin, vol. 1, 118-119. 
200 Ira Allen’s title during the Negotiations was Deputy Governor of Vermont, as well as Surveyor 
General. The revisions to the Constitution in 1786 did away with an individual’s ability to hold 
two public offices at once.  
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Vermont to “remain a Reasonable Time in a State of Nutrality,” allowing the 
development of civil society.201 
The Haldimand negotiations were deemed a necessity for the Vermont state’s 
survival. In early 1782, most likely in anticipation of the Haldimand Negotiations going 
public, Jonas Fay, Ira Allen, and Abel Curtis asked The Freeman’s Journal of 
Philadelphia to publish a copy of a remonstrance submitted to the Continental Congress 
back in 1780. They desired newspaper readers as far away as Philidelphia to learn that 
the course Congress was pursuing in regard to Vermont deviated from “every principle 
of the law of nature or nations.”202 Vermont, according to the remonstrance, deserved a 
fair hearing for their case: 
For if the dispute is between the states claiming on the one part, and the state of 
Vermont on the other, whether the latter be a state de jure, or an independent 
jurisdiction de facto, they ought to be so considered in the course of the dispute, 
till the power interposing have determined whether the latter be an independent 
jurisdiction de jure.203  
 
The Vermont state was not willing to give up the “men and money we have expended,” 
and they were not willing to be considered “in the specious pretext of rioters tortuously 
assuming government.” The representatives of Vermont felt “they [could] no longer sit 
as idle spectators without betraying the trust reposed in them.” If they willingly accepted 
Congress’ decision to deny Vermont’s existence, Vermont would essentially be “denying 
                                                
201 Ira Allen to Frederick Haldimand 7/10/1781. I believe the words “reasonable time” had no 
correlation to a planned date when Vermont would look to revoke its independent status, but 
rather it was a colloquialism equivalent to “until further notice.” 
202 The Freeman’s Journal, 3/6/1782, 1. 
203 For more on Vermont’s “de facto” and “de jure” jurisdiction, see Vermont Becomes a State, 
ix. 
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itself”—something according to Descartes no human could do, and according to Locke 
and Hobbes no state entrusted with the preservation of a people could do.  
 Perhaps the most significant aspect of the conclusion to the Haldimand 
negotiations was that Vermonters remained overwhelmingly supportive of the concept 
of a Vermont state. New York’s continuous refusal to effectively answer local grievances 
during the early years of the Vermont state—including a rather solemn-toned 
proclamation from its government in 1781 that will be discussed below—coincided with 
Fig. 4 From “An accurate map of the State and Province of New-Hampshire in New England, taken from actual 
surveys of all the inhabited part, and from the best information of what is uninhabited…” by Abel Sawyer, 1784, 
Library of Congress, Maps Division, https://www.loc.gov/resource 
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the political fervor in Vermont produced when the Haldimand negotiations became 
public knowledge.204 Rather than cause Vermonters to turn against the Vermont system, 
the Haldimand negotiations caused an increasing amount of involvement in Vermont 
governance. This was catalyzed partly by a second wave of east-siders formerly loyal to 
New York.  
 
The Conclusion of the Grants Controversy 
In order to be a fully independent state, it was vital that Vermont remove all ties 
between its inhabitants and the government of New York. There were still two different 
kinds of people living in the state after the state conventions of 1777: those who 
supported the new Vermont state, and those who resided in the territory claimed by 
Vermont, yet remaining loyal to New York.  Even after the state conventions of 1777 
had gone far toward creating an independent state, New York still attempted to hold on 
to the loyalties of residents in the Hampshire Grants. Inhabitants did what they 
considered necessary for survival as they granted either New York or Vermont their 
individual sovereignty.  
The Resolutions of the Council of Safety of New York show that New York 
officers first became aware “that many people in the Eastern district of this State are 
endeavoring to erect the same into a separate & independent State” in July, 1777.205 
                                                
204 The resulting political fervor in the Vermont state is discussed in Robinson, 178. 
205 Documentary. History of New York, Vol. 4, 943. New York’s awareness was most likely 
caused by Heman Allen’s presentation of the Remonstrance to the Continental Congress in May. 
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Exactly how many people were “endeavoring” to do that is difficult to say, but one can 
assume from the sheer panic expressed by both the New York government and its loyal 
inhabitants in the Grants that it was an overwhelming number.  The severity of the 
situation was such that New York governor George Clinton issued a radical declaration 
in early 1778. Governor Clinton was fairly objective in his analysis of the origins of the 
current situation in the Grants.206 The “contest,” he wrote, had been the fault of the 
provincial governments from both New Hampshire and New York: New York’s higher 
quit-rent was unwelcome to those with “original grants under New-Hampshire or 
Massachusetts Bay,” and to defend their property, residents had resorted to violence. In 
response to the growing “disaffection,” Clinton wrote, “the legislature of the late Colony 
of New York,” on March 9, 1774, had passed “An Act for preventing tumultuous and 
riotous assemblies.”  Now, Clinton offered “an absolute and unconditional discharge, 
and remission of all prosecutions, penalties and forfeitures” initiated under the 1774 Act. 
In return, he asked that inhabitants accept the following measures:  
1st. That all persons actually possessing and improving lands…under New 
Hampshire or Massachusetts-Bay…be confirmed. 
2nd. All persons actually possessing and improving lands, not granted by either of 
the three governments, shall be confirmed…together with such additional 
quantity of vacant land, lying contiguous to each respective possession, as may 
be necessary to form the same into a convenient farm[.] 
 
                                                
206 “Declaration of the State of New York,” Doc. History of New York, Vol. 4, 951-55. Clinton 
had plenty of material at his disposal to study the case from the perspectives of all involved, 
especially after Ethan Allen’s A Brief Narrative of the Proceedings of the Government of New 
York was published in 1774. 
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The following six articles involved taxes and rents still to be paid upon a grantee’s 
confirmation of their land, however. New York was still not willing to freely give up a 
territory that would have been an advantageous boost to their economy during the war. 
Clinton concluded his declaration by directing residents to revoke any allegiance they 
have offered to Vermont, and instead direct their allegiance to New York, which by “law 
and of right they owe to this state.” Ultimately Clinton’s offer was the same one Grants 
residents had heard for years: their land deeds would be confirmed, but they had to pay. 
The response to the governor’s declaration was not marked with the “obedience 
and allegiance” the governor had hoped for. Residents from Durham, in the southern tip 
of Charlotte County, New York, for example, immediately petitioned the government 
respecting the complexity of their situation. They stated that in the past, their New York 
titles had been deemed worthless by separatists, and in consequence they were 
“compelled to purchase the New Hampshire title to their Lands under Penalty of being 
turned out of their possessions by a Mob.”207 Some of the petitioners had been banished 
by “Col Ethan Allen,” and then prevented from returning to their lands when “Mr. 
Thomas Chittenden (the Governor of the said pretended State)” labeled them “old 
Yorker[s].” The patience of these residents loyal to New York was disintegrating: 
Your Petitioners therefore most humbly pray that this honorable House will take 
into their serious Consideration the unfortunate & distressed Situation of your 
Petitioners and others who continue loyal to the State of New York, & take 
measures for effectually defending the Persons and Property of your subjects.208 
 
                                                
207 Documentary History New York, Vol. 4, 956-957. 
208 Ibid., 957. 
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This petition was then followed by another of similar content from Cumberland County 
in May of 1779. The increased anxiety in the documents appears to be due to the fact that 
upon his return from British capture, Ethan Allen was appointed judge of Bennington 
County in 1778, and immediately got to work on a (perhaps personal) vendetta against 
loyalist landowners. Seventy parcels of confiscated land were sold in Vermont in less 
than a year between March 1778 and February 1779.209  
An answer to the Yorker petitions was provided in June from the Continental 
Congress. In fear that inhabitants would not serve in frontier militias under the new 
Vermont state, Congress requested that individuals take their “Turn of Militia Duty for 
the Defence of the frontiers,” even if it was demanded by the “Authority of the State of 
Vermont.”210 These residents loyal to New York were then assured “by interposition of 
Congress a happy Accommodation of all Differences in a short Time.” In an effort to 
ease the tensions, Congress reported to the petitioners that they had received an assurance 
from “Governor Chittenden that [Yorkers] shall not be molested.” Congress’s final 
request was for inhabitants to behave “quietly and orderly while the measures for 
                                                
209For a discussion of Allen’s return and land confiscation, see Inventing Ethan Allen, 235, note 
34; Freedom and Unity, 110; Revolutionary Outlaws, 167. It is important to note that Vermont 
by 1779 included towns from the former Cumberland County. The confiscation of “the Property 
of the loyal Subjects of [New York]” coincides almost exactly with the moment when the state, 
led by Ethan Allen, obeyed Congress’s orders to confiscate and then sell the lands of British 
loyalists. An economic and territorial boost for the Vermont state no doubt, but it seems 
reasonable to assume that the language of “confiscating loyalist property” produced wider 
support for the Vermont state’s actions against those loyal to New York. For an examination of 
the land confiscated during this period see Mary Greene Nye , “Loyalists and Their Property,” in 
Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society, Vol. X, No. 1, pg. 36-44 (Montpelier: Vermont 
Historical Society, 1942), 40.   
210 Documentary History of New York, Vol. 4, 977-978. 
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Pacification are on foot.”211 An authority asking for patience was something inhabitants 
were probably all too acquainted with. 
 In addition to obtaining the promise from Chittenden, Congress assigned John 
Atlee and John Witherspoon to look into the Grants controversy. Atlee and Witherspoon 
submitted eleven questions to Thomas Chittenden, titled “Queries of the Committee of 
Congress,” in an effort to better understand the perspective of the Vermont state and its 
supporters.212  The general theme of Chittenden’s response was that Vermonters had 
acted with a sincere concern that New York could not effectively provide for the 
residents. Chittenden stated that Vermonters were as “unwilling to be under the 
Jurisdiction of New York as we can conceive America would be to revert back under the 
Power of Great Britain.” “Experience” had taught Vermonters that “it would greatly 
impede the settlement of this Country to have it affixed to New York.”213 The response 
Chittenden provided on behalf of Vermont was clear: Vermont was to be independent no 
matter what. 
In the early 1780s, petitions from Vermont flooded the New York government in 
a way that resembled the period of the late 1760s and early 1770s. No longer were 
petitions submitted under the title of counties: they came at an accelerated rate from the 
                                                
211 “Gov. Chittenden’s Promise” can be found in Documentary History of New York, Vol. 4, 978: 
“I would recommend while [inhabitsnts] continue to do their proportion in the present War, the 
suspending of all prosecutions in the Law against those who acknowlddge themselves Subjects 
of the State of New York (except Capitol Offences) until Congress make a final Determination 
in the Matter.” 
212 Chittenden’s response may be found in Documentary History of New York, Vol. 4, 979-81.  
 
 97 
individual towns—a trend that deserves further analysis. A petition from Danville, New 
York, dated March 1782, claimed that there were “Numbers of familys now among us 
who have scarce one Bushel of Grain.”214 This distressed situation the petitioners blamed 
on a political cause: “the Insenuation of Artfull and Designing men [that] your Petitioners 
were Seduced to Swerve…allegiance” away from New York. The swerve of allegiance 
was necessary to keep their livelihoods. As a petition from White Creek, New York, 
stated, they had “swerved” their allegiance but remained “allways in rediness to oppose 
our Enemy”— the Vermont state.215  These loyal towns were only doing as Governor 
Clinton wished: they conducted themselves “with Prudence towards the Revolters,” and 
only submitted “where there [was] no alternative left between submission & inivitable 
Ruin.”216 
Governor Clinton addressed the inhabitants of Cumberland County in 1782 for 
the last time. With a regretful tone, he asked his subjects to “persevere in the peaceable 
Line of Conduct.”217 The towns gave up submitting their grievances to the New York 
government. By 1781, as Vermont divided two into five counties, a newly established 
court system was able to serve the people who had been deprived of such efficient civil 
services under New York. The Vermont legal system gained significant support from 
individuals who were actively using the institution. In the single year of 1781, 
                                                
214 Documentary History of New York, 4, 1009. 
215 Documentary History of New York, 4, 1010. 
216 Quote from Governor Clinton to Samuel Minott, 5/14/1779 and 6/7/1779; Documentary 
History of New York, 4, 963-3, 970-1. 
217 Documentary History of New York, 4, 1013-4. 
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Bennington and Windham Counties alone saw 176 cases, and over one-tenth of male 
adults were seen in court the following year when 250 cases were brought before the 
same counties.218 
After Clinton’s address in 1782, the final document recorded in the “Papers 
Relating to the Difficulties Between New York and New Hampshire” was from 
“Vermont Sufferers” who sought retribution in 1786. Their appeal summarized the lives 
of Grants inhabitants who were loyal to the New York government after the Vermont 
state was established.  They had “sacrificed their all, suffered such exquisite Tortures, 
Banishments, Imprisonments in loathsome Gaols, half starved, and threatened with being 
put to Ignominious Deaths[.]”219  It is beyond the extent of this thesis to verify whether 
or not all of the 1786 petitioners were properly compensated when the Vermont state 
completed payment of its debt to New York in 1799.220 
The Council of Censors 
In October of 1783, only a month after the Revolutionary War came to an official 
end, the Vermont legislature moved forward with plans “to begin the settlement of new 
lands, that have been prevented by the late war between Great-Britain and America.”221 
                                                
218 Michael A. Bellesiles, “The Establishment of Legal Structures on the Frontier: The Case of 
Revolutionary Vermont,” in The Journal for American History, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Mar., 1987), pp. 
895-915; 907-8. See also Revolutionary Outlaws, 171-177. 
219 Documentary History of New York, 4, 1016. 
220 Paul S. Gillies, “Adjusting to the Union: An Assessment of Statehood, 1791-1816,” in A More 
Perfect Union: Vermont Becomes a State, ed. Michael Sherman (Montpelier: Vermont Historical 
Society, 1991), 117. 
221 William Slade, ed., Vermont State Papers; Being a Collection of Records and Documents, 
Connected with the Assumption and Establishment of Government by the People of Vermont…, 
(Middlebury: J. W. Copeland, 1823), 476. 
 99 
For those still not ready to take the oath of loyalty to Vermont, a taste of Yorkers’ old 
medicine was practiced in October when Vermont declared that if any inhabitant 
remained in opposition to Vermont authority, like those “of Windham, to the greater 
disturbance of the peace, [that] have banded together,” a precedent was now in full effect 
to station “able” and “Effective men” to “assist the officers of government” in executing 
Vermont law. That there is an apparent disappearance of Yorkers by the end of the war 
suggests that these inhabitants either kept quiet in fear of punishment by the state, were 
forcefully evicted, or accepted Vermont and focused their political energy towards its 
government. By 1785, when the Council of Censors was up for election, the Vermont 
state was functioning effectively and it appears that inhabitants were unable to ignore 
this fact. 
The Council of Censors is described in the final article of the 1777 Constitution. 
So “the freedom of this Commonwealth may be preserved inviolate, forever,” the article 
mandated that in the year 1785, and every seven years after, “thirteen persons, who shall 
be chosen in the same manner the council is chosen—except that they shall not be out of 
the Council or General Assembly,” were to convene and discuss three topics pertaining 
to the functioning of the Vermont state: to assess the conduct of the executive and 
legislative branches; to investigate the civil administration of justice, e.g., to ascertain 
that “taxes have been justly laid and collected”; and to make sure the laws have been 
“duly executed.”222 In addition to these duties, the Council of Censors had the ability to 
                                                
222 1777 Constitution, Section XLIV. 
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“meet within two years after their sitting” and decide whether or not the constitution “has 
been preserved inviolate in every part.”223  
The Vermont Gazette published an act of legislation in late 1784 requiring 
constables to announce to the towns at least “twelve days before the last Wednesday in 
March next” the election of the Censors.224 It was further enacted by the General 
Assembly that the elected Censors were to meet in Norwich, Vermont, an east-side town 
along the Connecticut River.225 By the end of 1785, the Censors had already ordered the 
publication and distribution of three hundred copies of a set of proposed constitutional 
revisions.  These would be brought to the legislature for revision and adoption.226  Two 
newspapers were now being published in the state, a luxury not available in 1777, so the 
proposed revisions to the constitution could be widely distributed. In January 1786, the 
revisions were published in The Vermont Gazette.227 The Censors then ordered that “one 
thousand Copies of the Draft…be printed for the Perusal and consideration of the 
                                                
223 “The Constitution as Revised by the First Council of Censors and Recommended for the 
Consideration of the People,” in Paul S. Gillies and D. Gregory Sanford, Records of the Council 
of Censors of the State of Vermont, (Montpelier: Published by Authority of James H. Douglas 
Secretary of State, 1991) 55-6. 
224 Vermont Gazette, 12/20/1784. 
225 In June, Benjamin Carpenter, Jonathan Hunt, and Micah Townshend were resolved to 
“examine the constitution of this State,” Council of Censors, 23. Only a few years earlier, in 
1780, Micah Townshend had submitted a petition “on behalf of…the Inhabitants of [Cumberland 
County]” concerning the “pretended State of Vermont.” Documentary History of New York, 
1003. Benjamin Carpenter’s name is listed as a petitioner to the New York government in a 
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226 Council of Censors, 34.  
227 Vermont Gazette, 1/16/1786, 2. 
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People;” copies were available at the printing offices of The Vermont Journal by 
March.228  
The records and revisions of the Council of Censors demonstrate a primary 
concern with the apparent arbitrariness of the Vermont state under the 1777 constitution. 
Of the fifteen resolutions made by the Council, nine were involved with the “severity” 
of punishments, or the imbalance of state powers.229 One legislative act of February 1779, 
entitled “An act to prevent riots, disorders, and contempt of authority within this State,” 
was deemed by the Censors to be “unjust and impolitic,” as well as “prejudicial to the 
peace of society.”230 The Censors also proposed to restrict the power of the freemen’s 
vote. No longer would elections to the executive council be made at large, but “chosen 
from each county in the State, by freemen residing in the same county.”231 In addition to 
election alterations, the revised constitution frequently included the words “in a legal 
way” following the enumerated powers of the people. For example, in the 1777 
Constitution, Article V of the Rights of Inhabitants stated that “all power being originally 
inherent in, and consequently, derived from the people…therefore, all officers of 
                                                
228 Council of Censors, 36. 
229 Ibid., 37-42. 
230 Ibid., 37. 
231 “Revised Constitution,” Chapter II, Section IX, Ibid., 48. 
 102 
government” were “at all times accountable to them.” The revised article stated that 
officers were “at all times, in a legal way, accountable to them.”232  
The polemics surrounding promissory notes and the Vermont legal system serve 
as a fitting anecdote to illuminate the significance of the Censors’ work for Vermonters. 
The exchange in kind and notes was well established in the state by 1784. For example, 
William Blodget advertised an assortment of goods in November 1784, for which he was 
willing to receive: 
Public securities of all kinds, of the states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, 
Peirce’s and Imlay’s Notes, Furs of all sorts, Cash, Flour, Wheat, Rye, Oats, Corn, 
Butter, Cheese, Pot Ash, Beans, Peas, Flax Seed and Ginsang if very dry and 
good.233 
The promissory notes that belonged to Peirce and Imlay above were a common form of 
exchange. A typical note would involve one party’s promise to pay the other, signed, 
dated, and usually witnessed. During the early years of Vermont, these promissory notes 
grounded the state’s economy, but according to a commentary in Spooner’s Vermont 
Journal, the promissory system had been corrupted by May of 1785.234 From Hartford, 
the author wrote that it was “very fashionable” for inhabitants to be “forging and selling 
private notes of hand.”235 The report provided an example: “five or six of these forged 
notes have been brought to a gentleman in Middletown, who has not a note against him 
                                                
232For more on “the legal way” insertions, articles VI, XX, and XXII, see Council of Censors, 
xii. 
233Vermont Gazette, 11/15/1784. Another good example is the advertisement of “Benj.G. 
William” found in Vermont Gazette, 3/7/1785, 3. 
234 For an eighteenth-century analysis of promissory notes, in which the author noticed (of course) 
that promissory notes are based “in the infancy of mankind,” see Stewart Kyd, Treatise on the 
Law of Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (London, 1790).  
235 Spooner’s Vermont Journal, 5/3/1785, 3. 
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on earth.” Trust amongst the Vermont people was disintegrating, and it was perhaps for 
this reason that polemics surrounding the Censors’ actions most notably concerned the 
empowerment of the Vermont state. Supporters of the revisions to the Constitution 
wanted a tightening of the Vermont system, but the last thing many debtors or 
counterfeiters would have liked, since they were already in a vulnerable legal position, 
was for the Censors to initiate a systematic strengthening of the state. 
 Public creditors were one group that was particularly enthusiastic about the 
Censors’ proposed constitutional revisions. “Observer,” clearly of the crediting class, 
lamented that “the numberless actions that are bro’t before the courts on promissory 
notes, clear and evidently binding, is one great source of poverty to our state.”236 Mark 
                                                
236 Vermont Gazette, 1/3/1785, 2. 
Fig. 5 “Cambridge Nov 5, 1788. For value received I promise to pay Mrs. Margaret Emery on Order, Nine 
pounds, six shillings & two pence [?] on demand, with interest till paid,” Williams, Samuel, "Promissory 
note to Margaret Emery," 11/5/1778, Samuel Williams Papers, 2-24, Special Collections, University of 
Vermont Library.  
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G. Schmeller in Invisible Sovereign has demonstrated that the concept of credit in early 
America was closely related to the “public opinion” about trust. Economic relationships 
are ones where “the debtor is beholden to the creditor, but the creditor is interested in the 
debtor’s financial prospects.”237 Observer’s fundamental complaint about the current 
Vermont state was that its crediting system was inadequate, a problem many early 
governments struggled with. A clear connection with Hobbes’s notion of trust is evident 
in Observer’s complaint that Vermonters were “evading the just compliance of their 
contract with each other.” Public creditors in Vermont, like Observer, whose “vested 
interests fostered an attentive yet cautious political attitude,” instilled an amount of faith 
in their fellow Vermonters that was certainly not present in the late 1770s.238  
The concluding remarks of the Censors signified a new era of political feeling in 
Vermont. After the Censors had finished setting out the proposed revisions of the 
function and system of the state, they gave thanks the initial founders. It was these 
“husbandmen, unexperienced in the arts of governing” who were responsible for 
Vermont’s existence. And although the Censors were “obliged to check” the system these 
men erected, they confessed: 
[Vermont] is much indebted, even for its present existence as a separate 
community, to that undaunted firmness, and prudent vigilance for the public 
safety…At open war with the most potent nation in Europe;--frequently 
threatened with invasions from a sister State, and, by her insidious arts, a 
powerful disaffection fomented within the bowels of this commonwealth.239 
                                                
237 Schmeller goes on to incorporate John Maynard Keynes’s “third-degree thinking.” See 
Invisible Sovereigns, 44. 
238 Ibid., 47. 
239 The “sister State” was of course New York, and the “powerful disaffection” was those who 
attempted to maintain relations with the New York government.  
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The success of the Council of Censors signified a new epoch in Vermont’s existence as 
an independent republic. The Vermont state, along with its people, had survived one 
constitutional cycle as established by the 1777 constitution. Inhabitants of the Green 
Mountains were thankful for their state: public toasts published by the Vermont  Gazette 
for the 1786 New Year celebrated not only the tenth year of “Independence of the United 
States,” but also “the Ninth of the Sovereignty and Independence of Vermont.”240  
Vermonters and the Revised Constitution 
For the pseudonymous author Observer, there was hope in the Council of 
Censors. It was the Censors who could alter “the countenance which the laws give to this 
baneful evil,”  but only if the Censors’ work was better “calculated to the nature of the 
people, and our situation.” Observer’s perspective is most likely that of a former Yorker, 
one who had only recently altered his political allegiance from New York to Vermont. 
This author’s approval of the Censors’ work to straighten out credit problems would not 
be shared by debtors who relied on small-scale commercial exchange and promissory 
notes for their livelihood. 
The burgeoning newspaper culture offered a setting for polemical political 
discourse. The publishers of the Vermont Gazette, for example, announced their distress 
at hearing “from Poultney” that inhabitants “were burning the Constitution, as revised by 
the Council of Censors.”241  It was left to the readers to decide who was ultimately 
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241 Vermont Gazette, 4/3/1786, 3. One of the printers was Anthony Haswell, who had only arrived 
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responsible for the disrespect paid to “the unfortunate pamphlet.” The publishers of the 
Gazette did suggest, however, that it was perhaps an act of the “first Magistrates,” who 
they suggested opposed the “article limit[ing] the time for which any particular person 
may be eligible as governor.”242 Similarly, correspondent  “K. L.” wished to remind 
readers of Spooner’s Vermont Journal that unless the new revisions were adopted,  
we shall discover to the neighbouring States, and to the whole world, that we have 
lost, not only the sight of one eye, but have shut the other against that 
improvement which was designed, and will contribute to the benefit and 
importance of the State of Vermont.243 
 
The loss of the “sight of one eye” was undoubtedly a reference to Vermont’s recent 
failure to gain admission to the Union, and the shutting of “the other” described what 
would happen if the people did not support the revision of Vermont’s constitution. 
According to the publishers of the Vermont Gazette—one of two contemporary Vermont 
newspapers—the efficiency of the constitution, and thus the governing system of the 
Vermont state, was dependent on the acceptance of the Council of Censors’ revision. 
 Although newspapers were at the disposal of residents who had both political and 
geographic access to the printers, other residents resorted to more colorful and more 
violent methods to have their voice heard. Jeffrey L. Parsley has noted that in 
Massachusetts during the 1780s there existed an “older political paradigm that 
incorporated physical resistance to government as a live option for democratic 
expression.” This “older political paradigm” could certainly be found in the Green 
                                                
242 Vermont Gazette, 4/3/1786, 3. 
243 Spooner’s Vermont Journal 7/3/1786, 3. 
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Mountain Boys during the 1770s. It emerged yet again in Vermont shortly after the 1786 
revisions were passed into law, when on October 31, a mob interposed at the Windsor 
courthouse. 244  
A month later, on November 21, soon after the daily adjournment at 2:00 p.m, 
“several persons, who called themselves a committee from the people, waited on the 
judges of the court, with a petition requesting” that they adjourn until further notice.245 
Having not received the response they were hoping for, “with an armed force they took 
possession of the court-house, [and] sent dispatches for a reinforcement of their party.” 
Although they retreated, the mob was said to have been led by Captain Benjamin Cooley 
of Pittsford, who served under Ethan Allen and Seth Warner during the Revolutionary 
war, and Thomas Lee, who had also spent time under Warner’s command. The evidence 
suggests that some members of the former Green Mountain Boys saw their authority 
waning, and acted in a manner that had served them well a decade earlier.  
Although it was true that former Yorkers were developing a new faith in Vermont 
at the time of the Council of Censors, the political voice of east-siders in the Vermont 
state was not yet fully represented. That Vermont approached the United States 
Constitutional Convention as a unified Vermont state, composed entirely of Vermonters, 
is shown by the systematic participation and ascendency of east-siders after 1785.  
                                                
244 Freedom and Unity, 120-2. For more background of these events, see Bennington and the 
Green Mountain Boys, 188-190. 
245 Vermont Gazette, 11/27/1786, 2.   
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Although violent and polemic modes of disapproval sprouted after the revised 
constitution was published, a critical aspect of the effective instalment of a state was 
attained by Vermont after 1785: the systematic representation of all eligible freemen. The 
insurgence of political opposition— “based on a combination of conviction and interest, 
led by Isaac Tichenor and Nathaniel Chipman” —against the west-side dominance of 
Vermont governance had begun to emerge as early as 1785.246 Before the 1785 elections, 
the only east-side representatives in the executive branch were Deputy Governor 
(Hartland) and Councilors from Townshend, Pomfret, Woodstock and Norwich, four 
towns since their land was claimed by Vermont (under the Hampshire Grants title) eight 
years prior. After the 1785 election, however, there was a proliferation of representation 
from the east side. Members from West Fairlee, Addison, Vernon, Newbury, and 
Newfane were elected to Councilor positions between 1785 and 1789. Finally, in 1789, 
Thomas Chittenden, who had held the position of Governor since 1778, was replaced.     
Chittenden’s replacement signified that the wedge which had begun to destabilize 
the west-side hegemony in 1785 had finally reached the top.247 At this point the Vermont 
state had systematically, and in practice, enfranchised the entire freemen populace. 
Although by no means a perfect and harmonious relationship, the state and the freemen 
of Vermont were from then on considered one; Vermont was no longer a “pretended” 
state. This complete form of sovereignty in Vermont was established just in time to 
                                                
246 In a State of Nature, 84. 
247 List compiled from E.P. Walton ed., Records of the Governor and Council of Vermont Vol. 
II, (Montpelier: Steam Press of J. & J. M. Poland, 1874) and Ibid, Volume III, 1875. 
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confront the United States Constitutional Convention—when the concept of sovereignty 
in western thought was systematically changed in ways that truly expanded the concept 
in innovative, but not necessarily progressive, directions. 
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Conclusion 
Using a case study to draw local concepts of sovereignty into larger discussions 
of human nature is simply an alternative perspective on the same events Vermont 
historians have examined for the past two centuries. In the case of Vermont, the notions 
that humans have free will, and that individuals are their own sovereigns, were 
fundamental to systematically defining the state’s authority. It was a fundamental belief 
of the creators of the state that humans will naturally rise against anything that hinders 
their desires—whatever those may be. This was the standard of its government, and its 
representatives stood firm in their position on sovereignty against internal and external 
threats.   
 The Constitution of the United States brought a different kind of threat to 
Vermont sovereignty. The inherent hierarchical structure necessary for the federal 
government to have any authority threatened the aggregate power of the Vermont 
constitution. The United States government, by the nature of its institution, was an elite 
governing system erected so that the common causes of the American states —as defined 
by the U.S Constitution—could be defended within their territories. Admission into the 
United States initiated a new epoch in the history of the concept of sovereignty in 
Vermont, but the United States’ system, in its totality, also marked the dawn of a new 
epoch for the concept of sovereignty in universal thought.248  
                                                
248 Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 164-66. 
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After the first Congress in June 1791, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 
vacationed in the northern territory, which included a trip to the recently admitted 
fourteenth state, Vermont. Having only entered the Union a few months prior in March, 
Vermonters were hopeful that this visit would symbolize unity and a tight-knit 
relationship between the federal government and its states. Spooner’s Vermont Journal 
explained the political importance of such a trip, hoping that “the President of the United 
States…obtains useful knowledge, perhaps otherwise unobtainable, and while he 
enriches his mind, secures the affections of his people.”249 The president, via his officials 
Jefferson and Madison, was expected to actively secure “the affections of his people.” 
Supreme authority was no longer found in the titles of office, but in the souls of 
individuals. The United States had established a universal standard—one it still claims 
to live by today—that a government’s authority must systematically be derived directly 
from the people at large. 
Vermonters in the northern portion of the state, however, were not as willing to 
submit to the authority of the United States. The Vermont historian Paul S. Gillies has 
suggested three themes for examining how Vermont “adjusted to its new role as the 
fourteenth state:” the first is to pay particular attention to the “cost of settling up with the 
past,” which includes both their payment to New York (they never got away with their 
land for free after all) and the shared cost of the war with Great Britain; second is the 
                                                
249Spooner’s Vermont Journal, 6/6/1791, pg. 3. The trip appears to have been somewhat of a 
success in rallying support for the federal government, see Moses Robinson and the Founding, 
279.  
 112 
constitutional adjustment described above; and third is jurisdictional.250 Commenting for 
a brief moment on the jurisdictional theme is how I would like to conclude this project.  
In Leviathan, Hobbes provided a strict understanding of sovereign jurisdiction. 
He argued, with his typical absolutism, that sovereign power “cannot, without [the 
sovereign’s] consent, be transferred to another.”251 Unless, of course, there was “A 
Common-wealth by acquisition,” where “the sovereign power is acquired by force.” For 
this new entity to be considered “sovereign,” however, required the event of individuals 
coming together and “by plurality of voices, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorize all 
actions of that man, or assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his power.” The 
difference here is that individuals consent to the new sovereign because it is the entity 
“they are afraid of:” these covenants “proceed from fear of death, or violence, void 
[sic]…”252 For Hobbes, the transition of sovereign authority involved consent as a zero 
sum event in which the moment one provides consent a new sovereign is immediately 
established.  
Locke, on the other hand, divided consent into two distinct categories of 
“express” and “tacit.”253 The definition of express consent, Locke argued, “nobody 
doubts…makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of that government.” But 
there was an issue with “what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent.” How could 
                                                
250 “Adjusting to Union: An Assessment of Statehood, 1791-1817,” in Vermont Becomes a 
State, 114-143. 
251 Leviathan, 132. 
252 The full sentence continues as follows: “void: which if it were true, no man, in any kind of 
commonwealth, could be obliged to obedience.” Leviathan, 132. 
253 Two Treatises, 291. 
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consent be evaluated “where he has made no expressions of it at all”? Locke begins with 
the traditional absolutist view posited by Hobbes: “every man, that hath any possessions, 
or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit 
consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during 
such enjoyment [sic], as anyone under it.”254 In perhaps the most impressive description 
of human agency found in Locke’s political theory, Locke separates the individual mind 
from the person’s possessions. A government has a “direct jurisdiction” over the land a 
non-expressing individual “dwells upon,” but the “obligation [said individual] is under, 
by virtue of such enjoyment…begins and ends with enjoyment.” Locke sums up his 
argument by stating that nothing can make an individual a consenting participant of a 
commonwealth unless “actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express 
promise and compact.”  
Similar to the time and events that took place in the days of Vermont’s early 
history, it took time for some Vermonters during the early years of nationhood to accept 
the absolute authority of the United States.  
 
  
 
 
                                                
254 Ibid. 
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